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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the
problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete in-
formation. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of
the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms:
Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mech-
anisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating
a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information.
An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected util-
ities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be
optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the
public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost;
when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to
fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations.
If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent
any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a
situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly
matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse
matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay
are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I
derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild
conditions on the distributions of agents’ characteristics. Second, I prove that this
result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that
these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly
pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem
with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that opti-
i
mal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can
capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with
a small number of qualities.
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CHAPTER 1
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF AN INDIVISIBLE GOOD
1.1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good among two
agents when agents’ valuations of the good are private information. A typical
problem of such is the bilateral bargaining model in which a seller and a buyer
negotiate with each other as to if and how to trade a particular good. This problem
has generated a large literature since the pioneering work of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1982). Another more practical example is how to allocate a more
desirable office among two interested employees. The intense research interest in
this type of problem is derived from a fundamental dilemma due to Green and
Laffont (1977): when agents’ valuations are private information, it is impossible to
find a costless method that always gives the good to the agent with the higher
valuation.
Several methods are commonly used in practice to solve such allocation
problems: Lotteries, seniority ranking or other type of queuing, or even auctions,
are just few of the well-known examples. Many of such methods are quite
effective in soliciting agents’ revelation of true valuations. Yet some methods may
often assign the good to the agent with the lower valuation (lotteries), others may
incur negative cash outflows from the agents (auctions). At the more theoretical
level, two particular classes of methods have received researchers’ attentions. The
first class consists of all Vickery-Clark-Groves pivotal mechanisms (Vickery,
1961, Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973) that extend the conventional English auction
scheme. The second class consists of all fixed-price mechanisms (Hagerty and
Rogerson, 1987), in which the good is assigned to one agent (the seller) unless
both agents are willing to trade the good at a predetermined price. It is well-known
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that these two classes of methods have their own strength and weakness, yet no
one has ever carried out any formal comparisons of these two methods, not to
mention comparisons of more general methods.
We shall conduct a systemic investigation of various allocation methods
from the optimal mechanism design perspective. We are focused on methods that
are both robust and practical. Specifically, we require that all methods be immune
to individual manipulation so that it must be a dominant strategy for each agent to
reveal their true valuations. We also require that all methods be feasible so that
there would be no need of injection of money from outside. Our task is to find
among all such methods those that maximize the sum of the utilities of both
agents. We show that fixed price mechanisms are indeed optimal. In addition, this
exercise leads us to another class of mechanisms, called the option mechanisms. In
an option mechanism, one agent is the temporary holder of the good and the other
agent is the recipient of a call option that allows him to purchase the good from the
first agent at a predetermined price. The good changes hands as long as the option
recipient is willing to buy the good from the temporary holder at the
predetermined price. In comparison, under the fixed price mechanism, the good
changes hands only when both agents agree to the trade at a predetermined price.
We can show that option mechanisms are also optimal. In fact, the main result of
our paper is that any optimal mechanisms must be a lottery of fixed price
mechanisms and option mechanisms.
Our result makes a significant contribution to the literature of mechanism
design. While the optimal mechanism approach has been standard for the study of
Bayesian mechanisms, it has rarely been applied by anyone to study strategy-proof
mechanisms1. Our result is one of the very few that have identified the structure of
1 The fact that there few known results with strategy-proof mechanisms is not
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optimal strategy-proof mechanisms in a canonical allocation model2. It is also
interesting that we have found a new role for options. In the traditional finance
literature options are either used as instruments for risk management for investors
or as means to provide incentives for managers. In our model, however, they are
used as a part of a mechanism to maximize the sum of agents’ utilities.
1.2 The Main Result
Consider a model with two agents and one indivisible good. The good is a private
good so that it can be consumed by one agent only. Each agent has a quasi-linear
utility function for the good and the money transfer,
vi(xi; ti;qi) = qi xi+ ti:
Here the parameter qi 2 [0;1] is agent i’s valuation of the good, or i’s type and
xi 2 [0;1] is the probability that agent i receives the good. The value of qi is known
to agent i only.
When the values of q1 and q2 are commonly known, the efficient allocation
is to give the good to the agent with the higher qi. However, when q1 and q2 are
privately known only, it is not always possible to identify and execute the efficient
the only motivation behind our work. The predicted outcomes of a strategy-proof
mechanism are deemed reliable since all agents have unambiguous optimal actions
regardless others’ actions. The predicted outcomes of a Bayesian mechanism are
accepted only under strong informational and behavioral assumptions. For exam-
ple, one must assume that the distribution of agents’ types is common knowledge
among all agents and is also known to the designer of the mechanism. We will not
debate on the relative merits of Bayesian mechanisms, strategy-proof mechanisms
and other alternatives here. Interested readers can find them in other papers on this
issue (Chung and Ely, 2004, d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), Bergemann
and Morris, 2005, Jehiel et al, 2006).
2Miller considers a model that is similar to ours in a recent working paper
(Miller 2007, see also Athey and Miller 2007). After conducting a series of simu-
lations, he arrives at the conclusion that the fixed price mechanism maximizes the
sum of the agents’ utilities as a conjecture. Moreover, there is no mentioning of the
option mechanism and the characterization of all optimal mechanisms.
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allocation. We consider here direct mechanisms that ask agents to report their
types and use their reported types to determine the allocation as well as transfers to
the agents. This attention on direct mechanisms is not excessively restrictive since,
by the revelation principle, our analysis immediately extends to all direct
mechanisms in which both agents have dominant strategies at every type profile.
Otherwise, we allow nearly all direct mechanisms. In particular, we allow all
mechanisms that allocate the good to agents randomly.
Formally, a direct mechanism M consists of four integrable functions on
[0;1] [0;1]: x1(q1;q2); x2(q1;q2); t1(q1;q2); t2(q1;q2). Since x1(q1;q2) and
x2(q1;q2) are respectively the probabilities agent 1 and agent 2 receive the good,
they must satisfy
xi(q1;q2) 2 [0;1] ; and x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2) 1; 8q1;q2:
The functions t1(q1;q2) and t2(q1;q2) are transfers to the agents.
To ensure that agents have incentives to report their true types, we require
that all mechanisms under consideration be strategy-proof, i.e.,
q1x1(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2) q1x1(q˜1;q2)+ t1(q˜1;q2); 8q1; q˜1;q2
q2x2(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2) q2x1(q1; q˜2)+ t1(q1; q˜2); 8q1;q2; q˜2:
(IC)
We also require that all mechanisms be feasible so that it does not need outside
money,
t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2) 0; 8q1;q2: (F)
The majority of work on bilateral bargaining further assumes
budget-balanced-ness, i.e.,
t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2) = 0; 8q1;q2: (BB)
We don’t want to impose budget-balanced-ness in our work. Although money
burning seems inefficient ex post, it might conceivably increase the ex ante
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efficiency of a mechanism since it could provide incentives more effectively. In
fact, all Vickery-Groves-Clarke mechanisms that implement the efficient
allocation of the good do not satisfy budget-balanced-ness. If we were to impose
budget-balanced-ness, we would have excluded a large class of mechanisms that
are popular in the literature of mechanism design from consideration and the end
result would be much weaker.
So far the basic structure our model looks virtually the same as the auction
model with private values (Myerson, 1980) and the bilateral bargaining model
(Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983, Hagerty and Rogerson, 1987). The main
distinction between our model and the others is the difference in objectives. In the
auction literature the objective is maximal revenue extraction by an outsider from
the agents, whereas in the bilateral bargaining model the objective is maximal
revenue extraction by one agent (the seller) from the other (the buyer). In contrast,
we adopt the utilitarian viewpoint here and our objective is to find mechanisms
that maximize the sum of utilities of both agents.
Given any feasible strategy-proof mechanism
M = fx1(q1;q2); x2(q1;q2); t1(q1q2); t2(q1;q2)g, the sum of agents’ utilities is at
each (q1;q2) is
U1(q1;q2)+U2(q1;q2) = q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2):
Since the mechanism M satisfies feasibility,
U1(q1;q2)+U2(q1;q2)Maxfq1;q2g ; 8q1;q2:
If we could find a feasible strategy-proof mechanism M for which
U1(q1;q2)+U2(q1;q2) =Maxfq1;q2g ; 8q1;q2;
then M would be the optimal mechanism. However, this is impossible the classical
result by Green and Laffont (1977) shows. On the other hand, for every (q˜1; q˜2), it
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is easy to find a feasible strategy-proof mechanism M(q˜1;q˜2) for which
U1(q˜1; q˜2)+U2(q˜1; q˜2) =Max

q˜1; q˜2
	
;
(just the trivial mechanism that always give the good to the agent with the higher
q˜i). Hence, we cannot find a first-best mechanism that (weakly) dominates all
others at all type profiles. As a result, a meaningful criterion of optimality should
be based on some average measurement.
In a Bayesian model one must specify a distribution function P of agents’
types and one would naturally use P to calculate the average. We have not
specified a distribution of agents’ types yet since in our model agents choose their
best actions using the simple idea of dominance strategies. In the absence of a
distribution of types as the primitive of the model, we may use some discretion in
choosing a probability distribution to calculate the average. In his classical article
on utilitarianism (1955), Harsanyi argues that one may assume the uniform
distribution on the unknown when one is behind the “veil of ignorance.” Hence,
we will use in this paper the uniform distribution on agents’ types as the basis for
to calculate the average3.
LetF denote the class of all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms. For each
M 2F , the total utilities of M is given by:
TU(M) =
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2))dq1dq2:
3While this is a restrictive assumption, we want to emphasize that this assump-
tion in our dominance-strategy-based model is not nearly as strong as the same
assumption in a Bayesian model. First, agents’ optimal actions are independent
of this distribution assumption. Second, as a consequence, the set of all mecha-
nisms under consideration is independent of this distribution assumption. We are
simply using some probability distribution, from the viewpoint of the designer of
the mechanism, to evaluate the efficiency of various mechanisms. The use of the
uniform distribution reflects the fact that we are not really sure about the true dis-
tribution of agents’ types, which is one of the main reasons why we are studying
strategy-proof mechanisms in the first place.
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Figure 1: The Fixed Price Mechanism
Our goal is to characterize all mechanisms M 2F that yield the highest average
total utilities, that is,
TU(M) =MaxM2FTU(M):
Let us calculate TU(M) for some well-known mechanisms.
First, the canonical pivotal mechanism (or the second price auction
mechanism) MSP has the total utility TU(MSP) = 13 , which is not very high. It is
not even the best one among all V-C-G mechanisms. In a separate paper we find
the best V-C-G mechanismMBVCG with TU(MBVCG) = 712 (Shao and Zhou, 2007).
Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) consider fixed price mechanisms: assuming
that agent one is the seller and agent two the buyer, a trade will take place at some
fixed price p if and only both the seller and the buyer agree. Formally, the fixed
price mechanism with price p is defined as follows (see Figure 1):
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Figure 2: The Option Mechanism
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x1(q1;q2) = 0;
t1(q1;q2) = p;
x2(q1;q2) = 1;
t2(q1;q2) = p;
when q1  p and q2  p; and
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x1(q1;q2) = 1;
t1(q1;q2) = 0;
x2(q1;q2) = 0;
t2(q1;q2) = 0;
otherwise.
Among all fixed price mechanism, the mechanism with the price p= 12 yields the
highest total utility TU(MF) = 58 . (The same holds for the fixed price mechanism
in which agent two is the designated seller.)
In this paper we also consider another mechanism, called the option
mechanism, which is related to, but different from, the fixed price mechanism. It
gives the good to agent one conditionally and, at the same time, issues a call option
to agent two that allows him to buy the good from agent one at a fixed exercise
price of p. Obviously, agent two will exercise the option if and only if q2 > p.
Formally, it is defined as follows (see Figure 2):
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8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x1(q1;q2) = 0;
t1(q1;q2) = p;
x2(q1q2) = 1;
t2(q1;q2) = p;
when q2  p; and
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
x1(q1;q2) = 1;
t1(q1;q2) = 0;
x2(q1;q2) = 0;
t2(q1;q2) = 0;
otherwise
Among all option mechanisms, the mechanism with the option price p= 12 yields
the highest total utility TU(MO) = 58 . (The same holds for the option mechanism
in which agent two is the conditional owner of the good and agent one is awarded
the option.)
It is interesting that the best fixed price mechanism and the best option
mechanism yield the same level of total utilities. These two mechanisms differ
only in the region q1  12 and q2  12 where both agents’ types are greater than or
equal to 12 . The fixed price mechanism favors agent one by giving the whole region
to agent one, whereas the option mechanism favors agent two. The total utilities
are the same since agents’ types are distributed symmetrically.
The main finding of our paper is that both the fixed price mechanisms and
the option mechanisms (with p= 12) are optimal. Moreover, all optimal
mechanisms are convex combinations of these four mechanisms.
Theorem Every optimal mechanism is a convex combination of the two
fixed-price mechanisms and the two option mechanisms.
ProofWe will divide the proof into two parts. In Part I we show
MaxM2FTU(M) = 58 . In Part II we demonstrate that any mechanism that satisfies
TU(M) = 58 must be a convex combination of the four mechanisms.
Part IWe begin with the structure of a generic mechanism M 2F . First, sinceM
is strategy-proof, x1(q1;q2) is non-decreasing in q1 and x2(q1;q2) is
non-decreasing in q2. For every pair of such x1(q1;q2) and x2(q1;q2), we can find
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a continuum of pairs of t1(q1;q2) and t2(q1;q2) such that these four functions
define a feasible strategy-proof mechanism. The canonical transfers are the
generalized pivotal-taxes:
t p1 (q1;q2) = q1x1(q1;q2)+
q1R
0
x1(a ;q2)da; and
t p2 (q1;q2) = q2x2(q1;q2)+
q2R
0
x2(q1;b )db :
By definition, the pivotal-taxes are non-positive so that they define a feasible
mechanism. However, they represent outflows of money from agents so the
resulting mechanism is not efficient. To improve the efficiency of the mechanism,
we consider redistribution of the pivotal transfers between two agents while
keeping the incentive property of the mechanism intact. To achieve this goal, we
add some function of q2 only —h1(q2)— to t p1 (q1;q2) and some function of q1
only —h2(q1)— to t p2 (q1;q2):
t1(q1;q2) = q1x1(q1;q2)+
q1R
0
x1(a ;q2)da+h1 (q2) ; and
t2(q1;q2) = q2x2(q1;q2)+
q2R
0
x2(q1;b )db +h2 (q1) :
Obviously, the new mechanism is still strategy-proof. In fact, this is actually the
only way to maintain the incentives. We may consider these functions h1(q2) and
h2(q1)as rebates to the agents —h1(q2) is the amount of money agent 1 receives
when agent 2’s type is q2 and h2(q1) is the amount of money agent 2 receives
when agent 1’s type is q1. The total amounts of money that can be redistributed
between the agents are limited from above by the feasibility condition:
h1 (q2)+h2 (q1) q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
0
x1(a ;q2)da 
q2Z
0
x2(q1;b )db : (F)
Now let us estimate the upper-bound of
TU(M) =
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2))dq1dq2:
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Since q1x1(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2) =
R q1
0 x1 (a;q2)da+h1 (q2), we have
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2))dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
0@ q1Z
0
x1(t;q2)dt
1Adq1dq2+ 1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
0@ 1Z
t
x1(t;q2)dq1
1Adtdq2+ 1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(1  t)x1(t;q2)dtdq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(1 q1)x1(q1;q2)dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2:
Thus,
TU(M)
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
((1 q1)x1(q1;q2)+(1 q2)x2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2
+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2 +
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2 +
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2
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
1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2 +
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 
1Z
0
1Z
0
(q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2)) dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2
+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1 TU(M):
Hence,
TU(M) 1
2
0@ 1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2))dq1dq2
1A
+
1
2
0@ 1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2 +
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
1A : (E)
The equation holds in (E) if and only if
1R
0
1R
0
(t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2))dq1dq2 = 0.
The next Lemma gives us an estimate of the second term on the right hand side of
(E):
Lemma Let A be the area in that is below the minor diagonal q1+q2 = 1:
1Z
0
h1 (q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2 (q1)dq1  34  
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2:
Proof of Lemma Let us consider the feasibility inequality on the minor diagonal
q1 = q ; and q2 = 1 q :
h1 (q)+h2 (1 q)
qx1(q ;1 q) 
qZ
0
x1 (a;1 q)da+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q) 
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )db :
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We integrate the above inequality over q1 2 [0;1],
1Z
0
h1 (q)dq+
1Z
0
h2 (1 q)dq

1Z
0
qx1(q ;1 q)dq  
1Z
0
qZ
0
x1 (a;1 q)dadq +
1Z
0
(1 q)x2(q ;1 q)dq
 
1Z
0
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )dbdq
=
1Z
0
(qx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q))dq  
1Z
0
qZ
0
x1 (a;1 q)dadq
 
1Z
0
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )dbdq :
The first term is easy to estimate: Since
max
x1+x21
fqx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q)g=
8><>: 1 q ; q 
1
2
q ; q  12
;
we have
1Z
0
(qx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q))dq 
1
2Z
0
(1 q)dq +
1Z
1
2
qdq =
3
4
:
Through the change of variables, we can express the double integrals in the second
and the third term as integrals over the area A,
1Z
0
qZ
0
x1 (a ;1 q)dadq+
1Z
0
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )dbdq
=
1Z
0
1 q˜Z
0
x1
 
a ; q˜

dadq˜+
1Z
0
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )dbdq
=
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2:
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Putting these two inequalities together, we prove the lemma. Finally, we can apply
the lemma to (E) to obtain the desired estimate
TU(M) 1
2
0@ 1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2))dq1dq2
1A
+
1
2
0@ 1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2 +
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
1A
 1
2
0@ 1Z
0
1Z
0
(x1(q1;q2)+ x2(q1;q2))dq1dq2
1A
+
1
2
0@3
4
 
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2
1A
=
1
2
0B@ Z
[0;1][0;1]nA
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2
1CA+ 38
 1
2
 1
2
+
3
8
=
5
8
:
Since TU(M) = 58 for both the fixed price mechanisms and the option
mechanisms, these mechanisms are all optimal.
Part IIWe now show that any mechanism that satisfies TU(M) = 58 must be a
convex combination of the fixed price mechanisms and the option mechanisms.
We can see from the proof above that any mechanismM satisfies TU(M) = 58 must
also satisfy
h1 (q2)+h2 (q1)
=q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
0
x1 (a;q2)da+q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db ; a.e. (B1)
x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2) = 1 (a.e.) on [0;1] [0;1]nA: (B2)
To avoid unnecessary repetitions, we will drop the qualifier (a.e.) from the proof
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whenever we invoke (B1) and (B2)4. We now divide [0;1] [0;1] into four small
squares of equal size and study M on each of them separately.
Part II-1 Consider first the upper-left square (0; 12 ] (12 ;1]. On this area, agent 2’s
type is always higher than agent 1’s type. It is intuitive that the good should and
could be given to agent 2, i.e., x2 (q1;q2) = 1 on
 
0; 12
  12 ;1. Let us present a
formal proof. We begin with the upper half of
 
0; 12
  12 ;1 and prove
x2 (q1;q2) = 1 for (q1;q2) with q1 <
1
2
and q1+q2 > 1:
Suppose, on the contrary, x2(q 1 ;q

2 ) 1 d with d > 0 for some (q 1 ;q 2 ) with
q 1 <
1
2 and q

1 +q

2 > 1. Since x1(q1;q2) is non-decreasing in q1 and x2(q1;q2) is
non-increasing in q2 (since x2(q1;q2) = 1  x1(q1;q2) on this region), we must
have
x2(q1;q2) 1 d for all (q1;q2) with q1  q 1 and q2  q 2 (see Figure3):
In particular, this inequality holds on the minor diagonal q1 = q ; and q2 = 1 q
when q 1  q1  12 . Repeating a part of the proof of Lemma, we have
1Z
0
h1 (q)dq+
1Z
0
h2 (1 q)dq

1Z
0
qx1(q ;1 q)dq  
1Z
0
qZ
0
x1 (a ;1 q)dadq +
1Z
0
(1 q)x2(q ;1 q)dq
 
1Z
0
1 qZ
0
x2 (q ;b )dbdq
4The proof remains valid if we have to be more rigorous. At some steps we need
to use the Fubini theorem to justify our argument.
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Figure 3
=
q1Z
0
(qx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q))dq  
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2
+
1
2Z
q1
(qx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q))dq
+
1Z
1
2
(qx1(q ;1 q)+(1 q)x2(q ;1 q))dq

q1Z
0
(1 q)dq+
1
2Z
q1
(qd +(1 q)(1 d ))dq
+
1Z
1
2
qdq  
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2
<
3
4
 
Z
A
(x1 (q1;q2)+ x2 (q1;q2))dq1dq2:
When we plug this into the estimation of TU(M), we have
TU(M)<
5
8
:
This contradicts the assumption that M is optimal. Thus
x2 (q1;q2) = 1 for (q1;q2) with q1 <
1
2
and q1+q2 > 1:
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Now we show that x2 (q1;q2) = 1 also holds for the other half of [0; 12 ] (12 ;1] in
which q2 > 12 and q1+q2  1.
First, for any q 02 > q2 >
1
2 , we can find some q1 with q1 <
1
2 and
q1+q2 > 1. Then
h1 (q2)+h2 (q1) = q2 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db and
h1
 
q 02

+h2 (q1) = q 02 
q 02Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
Taking the difference of the two, we have
h1
 
q 02
 h1 (q2) = q 02 q2  q
0
2Z
q2
x2 (q1;b )db = 0:
Hence, h1 (q2) is a constant h12 on q2 2
 1
2 ;1

. A similar argument also shows that
h2 (q1) is a constant h21 on q1 2
 
0; 12

. Consider any (q1;q2) with q2 > 12 and
q1+q2  1. Since x1 is zero to the right of the diagonal, x1 is also zero on this area
for x1 is non-increasing in q1. Hence
h1 (q2)+h2 (q1) = q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
Choosing any q 02 > 1 q1  q2, we have
h1
 
q 02

+h2 (q1) = q 02 
q 02Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
Subtracting one from the other yields
q 02 q2x2 (q1;q2) =
q 02Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db  
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db =
q 02Z
q2
x2 (q1;b )db  q 02 q2:
This shows x2 (q1;q2) = 1. Hence,
x2 (q1;q2) = 1 on

0;
1
2



1
2
;1

: (II-1)
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Part II-2When we work with the lower-right square
 1
2 ;1
  0; 12, we can show
that h1 (q2) is a constant h11 on q2 2
 
0; 12

and that h2 (q1) is a constant h22 on
q1 2
 1
2 ;1

, and
x1 (q1;q2) = 1 on

1
2
;1



0;
1
2

: (II-2)
Part II-3 Now consider the upper-right square
 1
2 ;1
  12 ;1. (B2) implies
h12+h

22 = q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
0
x1 (a ;q2)da+q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
Since x1 (a;q2) = 0 for a < 12 , and x2 (q1;b ) = 0 for b <
1
2 ,
h12+h

22 = q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
1
2
x1 (a ;q2)da+q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
1
2
x2 (q1;b )db :
If we let both q1 ! 12 and q2 ! 12 , we obtain h12+h22 = 12 . Now plug it back into
the equation above,
1
2
= q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
1
2
x1 (a ;q2)da+q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
1
2
x2 (q1;b )db ; or
q1Z
1
2
x1 (a ;q2)da+
q2Z
1
2
x2 (q1;b )db =

q1  12

x1(q1;q2)+

q2  12

q2x2(q1;q2):
Since x1(q1;q2) is non-decreasing in q1 and x2(q1;q2) is non-decreasing in q2, the
equation above implies
x1 (a;q2) = x1(q1;q2); for all a 2

1
2
;q1

; and
x2 (q1;b ) = x2(q1;q2); for all b 2

1
2
;q2

:
It is easy to verify that this holds for all (q1;q2) 2
 1
2 ;1
  12 ;1 if and only if
there are two constants c1 and c2 with c1+ c2 = 1 such that
x1 (q1;q2) = c1 and x2 (q1;q2) = c2 on

1
2
;1



1
2
;1

: (II-3)
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Part II-4 Lastly, we consider the lower-left square
 
0; 12
  0; 12. We know
h11+h

21 = q1x1(q1;q2) 
q1Z
0
x1 (a ;q2)da+q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
When let both q1 ! 12 and q2 ! 12 , we obtain h11+h21 = 0. Hence,
q1x1(q1;q2)+q2x2(q1;q2) =
q1Z
0
x1 (a;q2)da+
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db :
So we can conclude that there are two constants d1 and d2 such that
x1 (q1;q2) = d1 and x2 (q1;q2) = d2 on

1
2
;1



1
2
;1

: (II-4)
To find out more about d1 and d2, we put together we have shown about h’s
and x’s. First, on the upper-left square, we have
h11+h

21= q2x2(q1;q2) 
q2Z
0
x2 (q1;b )db = q2 

q2  12

 
1
2Z
0
d2db =
1
2
(1 d2) :
Similarly, on the lower-right square
h21+h

12 =
1
2
(1 d1) :
On the other hand, we already know
h12+h

22 =
1
2
and h11+h

21 = 0:
These four equations together lead to d1+d2 = 1.
Hence, any optimal mechanism can be characterized by two parameters
c 2 [0;1] and d 2 [0;1] with the allocation probabilities given by the table in Figure
4:
There are four different combinations of extreme values of c and d:
(i) c= 0 and d = 0: this corresponds to the fixed price mechanism M00 in which
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Figure 4
agent two is the seller;
(ii) c= 1 and d = 1: this corresponds to the fixed price mechanism M11 in which
agent one is the seller;
(iii) c= 0 and d = 1: this corresponds to the option mechanism M01 in which
agent one is given the good and agent two is given the option; and
(iv) c= 1 and d = 0: this corresponds to the option mechanismM10 in which agent
two is given the good and agent one is given the option.
Any other optimal mechanismM is just a convex combination of these four
mechanisms:
M = cM11+(d  c)M01+(1  c d)M00; for c d; or
M = d M11+(c d)M10+(1  c d)M00; for c> d:
This provides the characterization optimal mechanisms among all feasible
strategy-proof mechanisms.
Q.E.D.
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1.3 Discussions
Before closing, we discuss more about our result in comparison with other known
results in the literature and explore some possible extensions of our result for
future research.
Every feasible strategy-proof mechanism consists of two parts: the first
part is the rule of assigning the good to the agents, and the second part transfers
that are necessary to force the agents to report their types truthfully. The loss of
efficiency may come both sources: either the good is not assigned to the agent with
the higher valuation, or the total transfer lead to a money outflow. A very natural
and important question is: What is the optimal trade-off between these two types
of inefficiency? However, this issue has never been addressed formally by others
in the previous literature. Most papers in the literature either focus on V-C-G
mechanisms or on trading mechanisms in which money changes hands between
two agents. These two classes of mechanisms are mutually exclusive by definition:
all V-C-G mechanisms are immune from the first type of inefficiency, and most
trading mechanisms — including the fixed-price mechanisms — are immune from
the second type of inefficiency. Hence, it is impossible to discuss the potential
trade-off within between the two types of inefficiency in either model. In order to
address this issue, we must adopt a more general setting that includes both V-C-G
mechanisms and trading mechanisms as subclasses of admissible mechanisms. We
have done it successfully in this paper. The finding is somewhat surprising:
although it might be expected that an optimal mechanism entails a compromise of
both types of inefficiency, our result indicates the second type of inefficiency
seems more damaging and it must be completely absent at any optimal mechanism.
Our model also differs from the model of Hagerty and Rogerson, and other
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models in bilateral bargaining, in another dimension for we do not impose
individual rationality on mechanisms under consideration in our model. Since this
enlarges the class of admissible mechanisms, this makes our result even stronger.
In addition, we are able to discover the two optimal option mechanisms, which
have never been studied before largely because they do not satisfy individual
rationality when one agent the designated seller and the other agent the designated
buyer5. In many allocation problems where neither agent originally owns the
good, such as the office assignment problem, the option mechanisms are better
alternatives than the fixed-price mechanisms as they are more equitable ex ante.
This advantage is not huge as it disappears once lotteries are admissible.
Once we break away from the bilateral bargaining model, it is then natural
to consider a model in which an indivisible good (or even multiple units of the
good) are allocated among more than two agents. We still do not have any formal
results in such a model yet. Admittedly, it will be quite difficult to obtain a
complete characterization of all optimal mechanisms. However, it is reasonable to
believe that we can still derive some partial results. While we are unsure how to
extend the fixed-price mechanism, we have found a generalization of the option
mechanism. We assign the good to an agent, say agent one, conditionally and
direct him to run a second-price auction of the good with the other n 1 agents
with a reservation price a . This mechanism always balances the budget since
money just changes hands from one agent to another. It should also be reasonably
efficient, depending on the value of a . The best value of a can be found by
maximizing the sum of the expected utilities of all agents (the transfers are absent
5Nevertheless, that the option mechanisms do satisfy the weak individual ratio-
nality condition that no agent has negative utility at any profile.
22
since the budget is always balanced):
a = argmax
0@1
2
an 1+
1Z
a
yd(yn 1)
1A :
Hence, a = 12 . Note that this optimal reservation value is the same as that in
Myerson’s mechanism in which the expected revenue of the seller is maximized. It
would be remarkable that the maximum efficiency in allocating an indivisible good
among n agents can be achieved when we give the good to one of the agents and
direct him to conduct a revenue maximizing auction with the other n 1 agents as
buyers. Of course, this is just a conjecture at this point, and further research is
needed to yield a formal answer.
Finally, we return to an issue we already mentioned when we set up the
basic model. Although we have made some justifications for our use of the
uniform distribution to calculate the expected utilities of the agents, one may still
ask what will happen to our main finding if different distributions are used.
Although it is clear that optimal mechanisms will change, we have not been able to
derive a full characterization of all optimal mechanisms for a general distribution
function of agents’ types. In a separate paper (Shao and Zhou, 2008), we
undertake a more modest task. Instead of including all feasible strategy-proof
mechanisms, we consider only the V-C-G mechanisms and the fixed-price
mechanisms (or the option mechanisms), two classes of mechanisms that are most
prominent in the literature. Assuming that the distributions of agents’ types are
independent and symmetric, we manage to find separately the best mechanism
among all V-C-G mechanisms and the best mechanism among all fixed-priced
mechanisms. Then we compare these two mechanisms to see which one is better.
For some distributions, the best V-C-G mechanism actually outperforms the best
fixed-price mechanism. However, in two important cases when the distribution
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function of types is either concave or convex, we show that the best fixed-price
mechanism beats the best V-C-G mechanism. We should point out that the model
of quasi-linear preferences with a general distribution of types is mathematically
equivalent to the model of more general preferences with a uniform distribution of
types. Copic and Ponsati (2004) have reported some results for the latter model in
the bilateral bargaining framework. While their work has made some progresses in
dealing with non-linearity of preferences, it still shares the similar weakness that
Hagerty and Rogerson’s work exhibits. For instance, it assumes
budget-balanced-ness so it excludes the V-C-G mechanisms as well as many other
potentially mechanisms from consideration. Hence, it cannot even compare the
efficiency of the fixed-priced mechanisms and the V-C-G mechanisms. This being
said, their work is already a rather complicated mathematical exercise. We
certainly cannot underestimate the difficulty we shall face when we try to find
optimal feasible strategy-proof mechanisms when we assume a general
distribution of agents’ types.
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CHAPTER 2
OPTIMAL EQUAL-COST SHARING SCHEME FOR THE ALLOCATION OF
NON-EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOODS
2.1 Introduction
Public goods have non-rival and non-excludable properties. The consumption of
the good by one individual does not exclude the amount available for others. By
correctly perceiving the negligible influence on the aggregate level provided one
has, individuals would take advantage of the public good without contributing
much. The direct impact reflected on the market is, the level of the public good
provided is usually far from being sufficient, efficient allocation would not be
generated under the gain-seeking strategic behaviors. Samuelson (1954) has
shown, the competitive market system is not appropriate to cover the allocation of
public goods. Different from purely private goods economy, increasing the size of
the population does not ameliorate incentive to ”misbehave”, it is even more
serious (Roberts 1976). The degree of insufficiency also depends on the
distribution of income. The under provision could be mitigated with the increasing
difference of income distribution (Olson 1982).
The recognized failure of the decentralized allocation encourages
enormous analysis of alternative mechanisms and the evaluation against efficient
yardstick. One natural solution is to introduce a central bureau, or called a
government, to coordinate decisions over the level of a public good provided and
shares of cost. Both production level and cost sharing are related to information of
individuals’ preferences. To induce individuals report their privately known
information, feasible mechanisms should satisfy certain incentive compatibility
conditions. One branch of the literature proceeds with scheme design in the
framework of general equilibrium models. Groves and Ledyard (1977) presented a
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class of optimal government rules, with which every competitive allocation
relative to a government scheme is Pareto optimal. Moreover, truth-telling
marginal willingness to pay for the public good is Nash equilibrium, yet not
yielding dominant-strategy equilibria. As an alternative to Groves-Ledyard
mechanism, a simpler incentive compatible scheme was provided by Mark Walker
(1981), and achieves Pareto optimal as well.
The other branch carries out incentive compatible mechanisms in the
partial equilibrium models with transferable utility. Groves (1973) developed a
general scheme to solve the conflict between efficiency and incentive in the
context of a team decision model. Furthermore, truth-telling is a dominant strategy
for each agent. It was later applied to a production problem with a group of firms
using public inputs, in which the coordinating agent determines the optimal
quantity of the public inputs according to the information each firm sends (Groves
and Loeb 1975). The efficiency and strong incentive properties make Groves
scheme glowing in the bunch of mechanisms. However, as Green and Laffont
(1977) pointed out, Groves scheme generally incurs negative aggregate transfers.
Redefine the measure of efficiency by adding aggregate transfer to the sum of
agents’ utilities, Groves scheme is no longer satisfactory. The negative result was
also obtained independently in Walker’s model with restricted individual
preference (1980). Both results implied that dominant strategy property can
generally be obtained only by sacrificing Pareto optimality. Green, Kohlberg and
Laffont (1975) showed this loss can be kept small by subjecting a small randomly
selected sample of the population to a particular Groves scheme. With retention of
optimality, the natural response is to use other implementation concepts including
undominated perfect Nash equilibrium (Bagnoli and Lipman 1989), subgame
perfect equilibrium (Jackson and Moulin 1991), and slack the strong incentive
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compatibility, for instance, Bayesian incentive compatibility. D’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979) proposed a mechanism that is Bayesian incentive compatible,
budget-balanced and optimal, but typical criticisms aim at the fact that the
outcome relies too much on the strong common knowledge assumption, and
eventually leads to the unreliable predicted outcome.
The objective in this paper is to investigate various allocation schemes of a
non-excludable public good between two agents using the optimal mechanism
design approach. Agents’ valuations of the public good are privately known. For a
robust predicted result, we require that all individuals have dominant strategies to
report their true valuations. We also require that the allocation schemes are feasible
so that there is no fund from outside. The goal is to find the optimal mechanisms
that maximize the sum of agents’ utility and aggregate transfer among all possible
allocation schemes. Our main result shows that the optimal mechanism is an
equal-cost sharing scheme. It suggests that the potentially large aggregate transfer
could indeed overturn the optimality of the commonly used Groves scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. In
section 3, we characterize all feasible strategy-proof schemes. In section 4, the
optimality of the proposed scheme is proved.
2.2 Model
The planner is concerned with the construction of a public project. The choice set
of the planner contains only two alternatives d = f0;1g. The decision d = 1
represents the agreement to build a public project–a bridge, a park, or a street lamp
etc. at a cost of c (0 c< 2), and d = 0 represents the decision not to build.
There are two agents, indexed by i= 1;2. Agents’ types q1 and q2 are
private information, independently and uniformly distributed over [0;1]. Each
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agent’s utility function is quasi-linear:
vi(d; ti;qi) = qid+ ti
where ti is the transfer paid for the construction of the public good to the planner.
In order to solve the free-rider problem, the planner provides a mechanism
under which agents have dominant strategies to report their true valuations.
Definition 1 A scheme is fd(q1;q2); t1(q1;q2); t2(q1;q2)g where
d : [0;1] [0;1]!f0;1g, ti : [0;1] [0;1]! R:
Definition 2 A scheme is said to be strategy-proof, if for all q1;q
0
1;q 2 2 [0;1],
fd(q1;q2); t1(q1;q2); t2(q1;q2)g satisfies,
q1d(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2) q1d(q 01;q2)+ t1(q
0
1;q2)
q2d(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2) q2d(q1;q 02)+ t1(q1;q
0
2):
Definition 3 A scheme is feasible, if for all (q1;q 2) 2 [0;1] [0;1],
t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)+ cd(q1;q2) 0:
The objective function of the planner is
EC(M) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[(q1+q2)d (q1;q2)+ t1 (q1+q2)+ t2 (q1+q2)]dq1dq2:
Remark 1 No mechanism outperforms all others at every profile of types. Hence,
we assume the government just chooses a scheme to maximize the expected value
of the sum of agents’ utilities and transfers, rather than pointwise optimization.
Definition 4 A scheme is optimal, if fd(q1;q2); t1(q1;q2); t2(q1;q2)g
max
fd();t1();t2()g
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[(q1+q2)d (q1;q2)+ t1 (q1+q2)+ t2 (q1+q2)]dq1dq2
subject to strategy-proofness and feasibility.
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2.3 The characterization of feasible and strategy-proof scheme
Mimic Myerson’s analysis (1981), we first characterize the feasible and
strategy-proof schemes in this part, then introduce one specific scheme in the class
of strategy-proof and feasible mechanisms —the equal–cost sharing scheme that
attracts the most interest.
By strategy-proofness, we know d(q1;q2) is non-decreasing in q1and q2.
Define f1(q2) = inffq1 jd(q1;q2) = 1g and f2(q1) = inffq2 jd(q1;q2) = 1g.
Graphically, f2(q1) and f2(q1) are the curves carving the whole area [0;1] [0;1]
into two parts, one on which d(q1;q2) = 1, i.e. the public good is built, and the
other on which d(q1;q2) = 0. Furthermore, functions f2(q1) and f2(q1) exhibit
non-increasing because of the non-decreasing property of d(q1;q2). The
strategy-proof mechanism can be described by ff2(q1);f1(q2);h1(q2);h2(q1)g
d(q1;q2) =
8><>: 1 i f q2 > f2(q1)0 i f q2 < f2(q1)
t1(q1;q2) =
8><>: h1(q2) f1(q2) i f q1 > f1(q2)h1(q2) i f q1 < f1(q2)
t2(q1;q2) =
8><>: h2(q1) f2(q1) i f q2 < f2(q1)h2(q2) i f q2 < f2(q1)
where h1(q2); h2(q1) are arbitrary functions on [0;1].
Remark 2We do not specify whether public goods should be built or not and how
to distribute the cost between agents when q2 = f(q1). However, it does not affect
the estimation of the upper bound of EC(M) later. So no condition is actually
imposed on the issue of breaking the tie.
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Besides strategy-proofness, ff2(q1);f1(q2);h1(q2);h2(q1)g should also
satisfy the following feasibility conditions,
h1(q2)+h2(q1) f1(q2) f2(q1)+ c 0 i f q2  f2(q1)
h1(q2)+h2(q1) 0 i f q2 < f2(q1):
2.4 The optimal scheme
Theorem The optimal scheme for the allocation of a public goods is an equal-cost
sharing scheme.
Proof This argument proceeds separately in two cases, these ares, 2> c 1 and
1> c> 0. For each case, we show, for all strategy-proof feasible schemes, the
expected value of the allocation of a non-excludable public good has an upper
bound, which is exactly the expected value achieved under an equal-cost sharing
scheme. Hence the equal-cost sharing scheme is optimal.
From previous description:
t1(q1;q2) = v1(q1;q2) q1d(q1;q2) =
q1Z
0
d(s;q2)ds+h1(q2) q1d(q1;q2):
t2(q1;q2) = v2(q1;q2) q2d(q1;q2) =
q2Z
0
d(q1;s)ds+h2(q1) q2d(q1;q2):
EC(M) =
1Z
0
1Z
0
[(q1+q2)d(q1;q2)+ t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)]dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
[(q1+q2)d(q1;q2)+
q1Z
0
d(s;q2)ds+h1(q2) q1d(q1;q2)
+
q2Z
0
d(q1;s)ds+h2(q1) q2d(q1;q2)]dq1dq2
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=1Z
0
1Z
0
[
q1Z
0
d(s;q2)ds+h1(q2)+
q2Z
0
d(q1;s)ds+h2(q1)]dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
[
1Z
s
d(s;q2)dq1]dsdq2+
1Z
0
1Z
0
[
1Z
s
d(q1;s)dq2]dsdq1
+
1Z
0
1Z
0
[h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(1 q1)d(q1;q2)dq1dq2+
1Z
0
1Z
0
(1 q2)d(q1;q2)dq1dq2
+
1Z
0
1Z
0
[h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
(2 q1 q2)d(q1;q2)dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1:
Both sides are subtracted by
1R
0
1R
0
[t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)]dq1dq2, we have
EC(M) 
1Z
0
1Z
0
[t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)]dq1dq2
=
1Z
0
1Z
0
2d(q1;q2)dq1dq2 EC(M)+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1:
Simplify the above equation, and we get
EC(M) =
1Z
0
1Z
0
d(q1;q2)dq1dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
1Z
0
[t1(q1;q2)+ t2(q1;q2)]dq1dq2
+
1
2
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1:
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Denote the area on which d(q1;q2) = 1 as A and the rest, d(q1;q2) = 0, as B.
EC (M) =
ZZ
A
dq1dq2+
1
2
ZZ
A
[t1 (q1+q2)+ t2 (q1+q2)]dq1dq2
+
1
2
ZZ
B
[t1 (q1+q2)+ t2 (q1+q2)]dq1dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h1 (q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2 (q1)dq1

ZZ
A
dq1dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h1 (q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2 (q1)dq1:
The last inequality holds due to the feasibility conditions.
Case I If 2> c 1:
First define the equal-cost sharing scheme M1E in this case as:
d(q1;q2) =
8><>: 1 i f q1 >
c
2 and q2 >
c
2
0 otherwise
t1(q1;q2) = t2(q1;q2) =
8><>:  
c
2 i f q1 >
c
2 and q2 >
c
2
0 otherwise
:
Clearly, the equal-cost sharing schemeM1E is strategy-proof and feasible.
Moreover, EC(M1E) =
(2 c)3
8 : In order to find the appropriate upper bound of
EC(M), we divide the set of f1(q2), f2(q1) into several subsets. Those subsets
cover all possibilities. We then show that, for each possibility, EC(M) has the
same upper bound (2 c)
3
8 .
I-a Suppose that ( c2 ;
c
2) 2 A.
Let q  = inffq j(q ;q) 2 Ag, and obviously q   c2 . From Figure 5,
we see
Area(A) = (1 q )2+
1Z
q
(q  f1(q2))dq2+
1Z
q
(q  f2(q1))dq1:
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Figure 5
Next, we try to estimate
1R
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1R
0
h2(q1)dq1. We may assume WLOG that
sup
q22[0;q]
h1(q2) 0 and sup
q12[0;q]
h2(q1) 0:
Hence,
qZ
0
h1(q2)dq2  0 and
qZ
0
h2(q1)dq1  0:
On the other hand, on the square [q ;1] [q ;1], feasibility implies
h1(q2)+h2(q1) f1(q2)+f2(q1)  c:
As we integrate the inequality above over [q ;1] [q ;1], we get the following:
1Z
q
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
q
h2(q1)dq1 
1Z
q
f1(q2)dq2+
1Z
q
f2(q1)dq1  c(1 q ):
Thus,
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1 
1Z
q
f1(q2)dq2+
1Z
q
f2(q1)dq1  c(1 q ):
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Hence,
EC (M)

1  c
2
ZZ
A
dq1dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h1 (q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2 (q1)dq1
= (1  c
2
)Area(A)+
1
2
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 (1  c
2
)[(1 q )2+
1Z
q
(q  f1(q2))dq2+
1Z
q
(q  f2(q1))dq1]
+
1
2
1Z
q
f1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
q
f2(q1)dq1  c2(1 q
)
= (1  c
2
)(1 q )2+2(1  c
2
)q (1 q )+(c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
q
f1(q2)dq2
+(
c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
q
f2(q1)dq1  c2(1 q
)
 (1  c
2
)(1 q )(1+q )+(c
2
  1
2
)(1 q )c  c
2
(1 q )
= (1  c
2
)(1 q )[(1+q )  c]
= (1  c
2
)(1 q )(1+q )+(c
2
 1)(1 q )c:
The last inequality holds since
f1(q )+f2(q ) = q +q   c2 +
c
2
= c:
Observe that (1  c2)(1 q )(1+q   c) achieves maximum value when
1 q  = 1+q   c since 1 q +1+q   c= 2  c is a constant. Thus q  = c2 .
Hence EC(M) (2 c)38 .
II-b ( c2 ;
c
2) =2 A, but there exists a (qˆ ; qˆ) 2 A, such that f2(qˆ)+f1(qˆ) = c. Denote
y= f2(qˆ) and x= f1(qˆ). We first estimate the upper bound of
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1R
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1R
0
h2(q1)dq1. We may assume WLOG that
sup
q22[0;y]
h1(q2) = sup
q12[0;x]
h2(q1) = a 0:
The feasibility condition on [x; qˆ ] [0;y], h1(q2)+h2(q1) 0, implies
sup
q12[x;qˆ ]
h2(q1) a:
Similarly, we also have
sup
q22[y;qˆ ]
h1(q2) a:
Hence
qˆZ
0
qˆZ
0
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2
=
ZZ
C
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2+
ZZ
D
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2
+
ZZ
E
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2+
ZZ
F
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2

ZZ
C
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2+
ZZ
F
(h1(q2)+h2(q1))dq1dq2
 2axy+2a(qˆ   x)(qˆ   y)
 2axy+2a(1  x)(1  y)
= 2a( xy+1  x  y+ xy)
= 2a(1  x  y)
= 2a(1  c) 0:
The last inequality holds due to 2> c 1, and area C;D;E;F shown in the Figure
6. Then,
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Figure 6
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1 
1Z
qˆ
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
qˆ
h2(q1)dq1

1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ):
The last part is obtained by integrating the feasibility constraint over [qˆ ;1] [qˆ ;1].
Therefore,
EC(M) (1  c
2
)Area(A)+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 (1  c
2
)Area(A)+
1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ):
Construct the new functions fˆ2(q1) and fˆ1(q2) as follows,
fˆ2(q1) =
8><>: f2(qˆ)1 i f q1 2 [f1(qˆ); qˆ ]f2(q1) otherwise
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Figure 7
fˆ1(q2) =
8><>: f1(qˆ)1 i f q2 2 [f2(qˆ); qˆ ]f1(q2) otherwise :
Denote the area that is shaped by fˆ2(q1); jˆ1(q2), x= 1 and y= 1 as A0, which is
shown in Figure 7. qˆ  is the intersection of q2 = q1 and fˆ2(q1) or jˆ1(q2).
Obviously, qˆ  =maxff1(qˆ);f2(qˆ)g.
1Z
qˆ
fˆ2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
fˆ1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ )
=
qˆZ
qˆ
f2(qˆ)dq1+
qˆZ
qˆ
f1(qˆ)dq2  c(qˆ   qˆ )+
1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ)
=[f2(qˆ)+f1(qˆ)  c](qˆ   qˆ )+
1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ)
=
1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1+
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2  c(1  qˆ):
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The last equality holds since f2(qˆ)+f1(qˆ) = c. The upper bound then is
EC(M) (1  c
2
)Area(A)+
1
2
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 (1  c
2
)Area(A)+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
f1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
f2(q1)dq1  c2(1  qˆ)
 (1  c
2
)Area(A0)+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
fˆ1(q2)dq2+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
fˆ2(q1)dq1  c2(1  qˆ
)
= (1  c
2
)[(1  qˆ )2+
1Z
qˆ
(qˆ   fˆ1(q2))dq2+
1Z
qˆ
(qˆ   fˆ2(q1))dq1]
+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
fˆ2(q1)dq1+
1
2
1Z
qˆ
fˆ1(q2)dq2  c2(1  qˆ
)
= (1  c
2
)(1  qˆ )2+2(1  c
2
)qˆ (1  qˆ )+(c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
qˆ
fˆ1(q2)dq2
+(
c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
qˆ
fˆ2(q1)dq1  c2(1  qˆ
)
 (1  c
2
)(1  qˆ )(1+ qˆ )+(c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
qˆ
fˆ1(qˆ )dq2+(
c
2
  1
2
)
1Z
qˆ
fˆ2(qˆ )dq1
  c
2
(1  qˆ )
= (1  c
2
)(1  qˆ )(1+ qˆ )+(c
2
  1
2
)(1  qˆ )c  c
2
(1  qˆ )
= (1  c
2
)(1  qˆ )(1+ qˆ   c):
As in previous case, EC(M) reaches maximum (2 c)
3
8 when qˆ
 = c2 .
I-c ( c2 ;
c
2) =2 A, but there does not exist a (qˆ ; qˆ) 2 A, where f2(qˆ)+f1(qˆ) = c. The
characteristics of f2(q) and f1(q) in this case imply that, for all q 2 [q ;1],
f2(q)+f1(q)  c> 0, where q  = inffq j(q ;q) 2 Ag. Particularly,
f2(1)+f1(1)  c= e > 0.
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Construct a new feasible mechanism determined by
ff˜2(q1); f˜1(q2); h˜1(q2); h˜2(q1)g, where f˜2(q1) = f2(1)  e2 , for q1 2 [f1(1)  e2 ;1];
f˜1(q2) = f1(1)  e2 , for q2 2 [f2(1)  e2 ;1]; h˜1(q2) = 0, for q2 2 [0;1] and
h˜2(q1) = 0, for q1 2 [0;1].
Notice that f˜2(1)+ f˜1(1)  c= 0. Denote the area under this new mechanism on
which d(q1;q2) = 1 as A”. It is clearly to see A A” by our construction. So we
have
8EC(M) 1
2
(2  c)
ZZ
A
dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h2(q1)dq1
 1
2
(2  c)
ZZ
A”
dq1dq2+
1Z
0
h˜1(q2)dq2+
1Z
0
h˜2(q1)dq1:
The new constructed mechanism is the one belonging to case I-b, using the proved
result there that the upper bound is (2 c)
3
8 , we get the same upper bound here.
Case II If 1> c> 0:
Define the equal-cost sharing scheme M2E in this case as:
d(q1;q2) =
8><>: 1 i f q1 >
c
2orq2 >
c
2
0 otherwise
t1(q1;q2) = t2(q1;q2) =
8><>:  
c
2 i f q1 >
c
2orq2 >
c
2
0 otherwise
:
Here, M2E is strategy-proof and feasible. Moreover, EC(M
1
E) =
1
8c
3  c+1. We
next show that in the class of all strategy-proof and feasible mechanisms EC(M)
has the upper bound 18c
3  c+1. Let x= j1( c2) and y= j2( c2). WLOG, we
assume that x y. First, find the upper bound of R 10 R 10 [h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2,
given each j2 (q1) and j1 (q2).
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Define the following function
l (q1;q2) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1 c+y
(1  c2 )2
i f (q1;q2) 2 [ c2 ;1]2
1
(1  c2 ) i f (q1;q2) 2 [y;
c
2 ] [ c2 ;1][ [ c2 ;1] [y; c2 ]
1
y i f (q1;q2) 2 [0;y] [0;y]
0 otherwise
:
Note that
1R
0
l (q1;q2)dq1 = 1 for all q2 and
1R
0
l (q1;q2)dq2 = 1 for all q1. Hence
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
l (q1;q2) [h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2:
From the feasibility condition, we have
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
l (q1;q2) [h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2
=
Z 1
c
2
j2 (q1)dq1+
Z 1
c
2
j1 (q2)dq2  c(1  y)+
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1+
Z c
2
y
j1 (q2)dq2:
40
Plug this into EC (M), we have
EC (M)

1  c
2

Area(A)+
1
2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[h1(q2)+h2(q1)]dq1dq2


1  c
2

1  c
2
2
+

1  c
2
Z 1
c
2
c
2
 j2 (q1)

dq1
+

1  c
2
Z 1
c
2
c
2
 j1 (q2)

dq2+

1  c
2
Z c
2
y
c
2
 j1 (q2)

dq2
+
1
2
Z 1
c
2
j2 (q1)dq1+
1
2
Z 1
c
2
j1 (q2)dq2  12c(1  y)
+
1
2
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1+
1
2
Z c
2
y
j1 (q2)dq2
=

1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+

c
2
  1
2
Z 1
c
2
j2 (q1)dq1
+

c
2
  1
2
Z 1
c
2
j1 (q2)dq2+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2
Z c
2
y
j1 (q2)dq2+
1
2
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1  12c(1  y)
=

1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2
Z c
2
y
j1 (q2)dq2+
1
2
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1  12c(1  y)


1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2
Z c
2
x
j2 (q1)dq1+
c
2
(x  y)

+
1
2
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1  12c(1  y)
=

1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2
Z y
x
j2 (q1)dq1
+

c
2
  1
2

c
2
(x  y)+ c
2
Z c
2
y
j2 (q1)dq1  12c(1  y)


1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2

(y  x)j2 (y)
+

c
2
  1
2

c
2
(x  y)+ c
2
c
2
  y

j2 (y)  12c(1  y):
Let j2(y) = z, note that 0 x y z c2 , this is also shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
Define
L(x;y;z) =

1  c
2
3
+ c

1  c
2
2
+
c
2

1  c
2
c
2
  y

+

c
2
  1
2

(y  x)z
+

c
2
  1
2

c
2
(x  y)+ c
2
c
2
  y

z  1
2
c(1  y):
For all 0 x y z c2 , L(x;y;z) L(0; c2 ; c2) = 18c3  c+1: Combing all the
cases discussed above, we can conclude that equal-cost sharing scheme is the
optimal scheme for the allocation of non-excludable public good.
Q.E.D.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Although Groves scheme exhibits seemly prominent mitigation of conflict
between allocation efficiency and incentive compatibility, the unbalanced budget is
a deadly blemish when the overall efficiency being evaluated includes the
aggregate transfer. Shao and Zhou (2008) challenges the wide acceptance of
Groves scheme by showing that all mechanisms including Groves mechanisms are
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weakly inferior to a particular class of mechanisms with budget-balance-ness
when allocating an indivisible private good between two agents under incomplete
information. In this paper, we prove the optimal scheme is equal-cost sharing,
rather than Groves scheme, in the allocation of a public good. Only a
non-excludable public good is considered here. However, for many non-rival
goods, it is also feasible to exclude consumers from usage. An efficient
mechanism for public goods with use exclusion is provided by Peter (2004), and
he claimed that a fixed fee mechanism is almost optimal.
One interesting follow-up research is to find the optimal scheme for the
allocation of public goods when there are more than two agents. The proof we
provided in this paper are mostly based on the geometric properties in R2. Things
appear much more complicated when the type space is extended to [ 1;1]n. Our
conjecture here is the optimality of the equal-cost sharing could survive through
such extension, but we may turn to an alternative method to show it.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERALIZED COARSE MATCHING
3.1 Introduction
Consider a canonical matching problem: there are two heterogeneous populations
of equal size. Agents within each population have the same preferences regarding
the other population. For instance, one population may consist of men and a
second of women. Within each population, agents differ by ability, beauty,
education, etc., and they each prefer agents from the other population with higher
ability, beauty, education, etc. If two agents (e.g., a man and woman) match, their
payoffs depend on the characteristics of both partners.
It is well known that if a payoff function exhibits complementarities, it is
optimal to match the two populations in a positive assortative fashion. (See Becker
(1973).) That is, men with the best (worst) characteristics are matched with the
women with the best (worst) characteristics. This method of matching is clearly
better than randomly assigning men to women. Indeed, the efficiency gain of
positive assortative matching over random matching can be significant.
This paper focuses on an intermediate method of pairing two populations,
namely, coarse matching. In its simplest version, each population is split into two
categories of agents—those with high characteristics and those with low
characteristics. (The number of agents with high characteristics is the same in the
two populations.) The set of men with high attributes is randomly matched with
the set of women with high attributes, and similarly with the sets of men and
women with low attributes.
More generally, coarse matching proceeds by partitioning the population
into n classes and then randomly matching individuals within each class. This is a
44
phenomenon we observe in practice. For instance, dating services classify agents
according to a small number of attributes that in fact partition them into coarse
classes. Similar examples can be found in labor markets.
This paper asks: how much of total surplus is captured by coarse matching
(henceforth, CM) when compared with total surplus generated by positive
assortative matching (henceforth, PAM)?1 Before coming to the answer derived,
let us explain the importance of the question.
Observe that PAM requires that a social planner know the actual type of
each member of each population. For instance, a matchmaker must know the exact
characteristics of each man and woman in given populations. When the
populations are large, this is a strong informational requirement. On the other
hand, CM only requires that the planner have coarse information, which may be
relatively easier to acquire. For instance, the matchmaker may have—or may
easily acquire—information on the income bracket of each man and woman in the
population (e.g., whether they earn less than $50,000, more than $200,000 or
between $50,000 and $200,000).
In practice, there is a cost of acquiring information on agents’ types. This
cost is not modeled in typical analyses. We would think that the cost of acquiring
perfect information is significantly greater than the cost of acquiring coarse
information. Given these costs, should the social planner implement PAM, or
should he settle for CM? The answer depends on whether the efficiency gain of
using PAM over CM is small vs. large. If it is small, it may not justify the cost of
acquiring this additional information.2
1In this paper, by PAM we mean perfect sorting, although CM also involves
positive assortative matching in a very coarse sense.
2This is not the only justification for CM. For instance, McAfee (2002) argues
that “The use of a continuum of priorities is not feasible in many circumstances-
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This question is not new. It was first addressed by McAfee (2002) in a
seminal paper. He considered coarse matching, where each population was
partitioned into exactly two classes. He showed that when the match payoff
function takes a certain (multiplicative) form and distributions of attributes satisfy
certain hazard rate conditions, then CM can capture at least half of the total surplus
generated by PAM.
McAfee (2002) raised an important question—but one that he did not
answer completely. For instance, he implicitly assumed that the coarse information
available indicates whether a particular member of the population is above or
below the mean. This may not be the type of information available to the planner.
Or, more interestingly, the planner may have the ability to choose the type of
coarse matching he desires. For instance, instead of the matchmaker acquiring
information on whether a man’s income is above the mean, he can acquire
information on whether his income is above a (different) threshold, or whether it
lies in one of three income brackets, etc. In other words, an important open
problem is how to analyze the performance of n-class CM when the planner does
not constrain himself to a particular way of partitioning the populations.
This paper tackles this problem and investigates the performance of n-class
CM (i.e., the fraction of the total surplus it obtains) for a very general class of
distributions. The main result shows that for each n, there is a way to construct an
n-class CM so that there is a “meaningful” lower bound on its performance. We
using many priorities makes the scheme unwieldy to administer and opaque to con-
sumers. Moreover, if the priority prices are determined by bidding, as is natural,
the auction process will be complex and expensive to operate when there are many
service classes.” For the cost, Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren (2010) suggests
that “These costs may take the form of: communication, complexity (or menu),
and evaluation costs for the intermediary (who needs more detailed information
about the environment in order to implement a fine scheme), and for the agents
(who need precise information about their own and others’ attributes in order to
optimally respond to a fin scheme), or higher production costs for firms offering
different qualities.”
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show that the efficiency loss from using n-class CM instead of PAM is bounded by
an expression that is proportional to 1=n2, where the constant of proportionality
depends on the distributions of agents’ characteristics but not on n. The paper
provides a method to compute this constant of proportionality, and it argues, by
way of example, that this constant—and hence the lower bound—is easy to
compute. It also shows by example that this lower bound is tight.
As in McAfee (2002), our main result assumes that the match payoff is
multiplicative in agents’ types. We show, however, that it generalizes to match
payoff functions that are supermodular in agents’ characteristics, so long as a
condition that involves both the payoff function and the distributions of attributes
is satisfied. Therefore, this paper substantially enlarges the class of matching
problems in which the performance of CM can be assessed.
An important step of the argument is that we choose how to divide two
given populations into n-class, so that the lower bound obtains. This is quite
different than the exercise in McAfee (2002) who assumes that the 2-class must be
divided based on the mean. Indeed, the structure of the mathematical argument is
also quite distinct from McAfee (2002). To trace a clearer parallel, Theorem 3.3.2
below shows that McAfee’s argument extends to 2n-classes. (This is intuitively
clear but not mathematically obvious.) The key is that, in this case, we can divide
the partitions into smaller partitions and still preserve the monotone hazard rate
requirements. It is not apparent, however, that the same applies to a partition of
arbitrary n classes, a problem that we are able to address successfully in our
n-class CM analysis.3
3A key trick in McAfee (2002) is to split the two populations at the mean value,
starting from random matching. We show that this extends to 2n classes by repeat-
edly splitting each class at the conditional mean associated with random matching
for that class. But in the case of an arbitrary partition there is no natural substitute
for the role that the conditional mean plays, precluding an extension to n classes.
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This raises the question: are there situations of applied interest, in which
the planner can effectively choose which coarse information to obtain? One
difficulty is that members of one or both populations may have incentives to
misreport and so not give the planner necessary information.
Nonetheless, we argue that the planner may indeed be able to obtain such
information. To make this argument, we consider a textbook problem of monopoly
pricing under incomplete information about a buyer’s valuation (type). This is not
typically thought of as a matching problem. But we show that, mathematically, it
can be thought of as a matching problem. It is well known that the optimal pricing
scheme involves a continuum of price-quantity pairs (or price-quality pairs), each
one tailored to a particular possible value of a buyer’s type. This is akin to PAM.
In practice, such a finely tuned pricing scheme may be impractical or too costly to
implement. Thus, an important issue for a firm is to assess how much profit is
sacrificed by using ‘simpler’ pricing schemes that pool intervals of types (e.g.,
involving only a small number of qualities or quantities offered). This corresponds
to CM.
It is not straightforward to apply CM results here to evaluate the profit loss
by using pooling contracts. Unlike the original canonical matching model where
incentive compatibility and participation conditions are absent, in this problem, the
payoffs of the optimal contract and pooling contracts are twisted differently due to
different numbers of incentive compatibility and participation conditions faced by
the monopolist. Therefore, the connection between pooling contracts and the
optimal contract is not as simple as the connection between n-class CM and PAM.
As another application, we analyze CM in a cost-sharing problem. In this
circumstance, a principal wants to procure a product from a firm. The cost of
production for the firm is randomly distributed. The firm can reduce the initial cost
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by exerting effort and bearing some disutility. Both initial cost and effort level are
unobservable to the principal. The principal can only observe realized cost. The
principal’s goal is to maximize cost reduction from the initial cost. This problem
involves both incomplete information of the firm’s initial cost and a hidden action
of the firm’s choice of effort levels. When facing a firm with initial cost drawn
from an interval, the optimal contract induces the firm to exert a different effort
level for each possible value of initial cost. Similar to the monopoly pricing
problem, this application is also amenable to a reinterpretation as a matching
problem. Once we account for incentive compatibility and participation, we apply
CM results to give a lower bound regarding the amount of cost reduction
accomplished by pooling contracts.
RELATED LITERATURE. Wilson (1989) considers a model where a
monopolist sells goods with limited supply to a continuum of consumers with
different valuations. He analyzed the efficiency gain of using a priority pricing
schedule. The priority pricing schedule involves each consumer receiving a good
out of the available supply in different priorities and paying different prices. This
schemes forms n priority groups of consumers based on the consumers’
valuations. Wilson (1989) shows that the efficiency loss of using n priorities
converges to zero at a rate of O
 
1=n2

. However, knowing the convergence rate is
not quite informative for understanding the performance of pricing schedules with
a given number of priority groups, especially when this number is small. McAfee
(2002) considers 2-class coarse matching. He proves that 2-class coarse matching
can achieve at least half of the efficiency gain under certain conditions. In
addition, he also provides a way to map Wilson (1989) into his matching model.
Therefore, 2-class coarse matching result can be used to evaluate the efficiency
gain of using 2 priorities in Wilson (1989). By contrast, our results allow any
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number of classes. In our paper the efficiency loss is bounded above by a number
proportional to 1=n2 Damiano and Li (2007) and Hoppe, Moldovanu, and
Ozdenoren (2010) study a matching model with two-sided private information. In
Damiano and Li (2007) the goal of the matchmaker is to maximize its revenue.
They provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the matchmaker
achieves maximum revenue with efficient sorting pattern (PAM). In our paper the
matchmaker is a social planner whose objective is to maximize total efficiency
from matching. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Ozdenoren (2010) also restricts attention
to 2-class coarse matching when establishing lower bounds on total efficiency, the
revenue of the matchmaker, and the welfare of the agents. Rogerson (2003) and
Chu and Sappington (2007) consider a procurement model with one-sided private
information and moral hazard under very special distributional assumptions. The
purpose of their papers is to establish lower bounds of the performance of the
optimal 2-level contracts in terms of cost. Although the model they consider is
quite different from the matching model in McAfee (2002), Rogerson (2003)
points out that there seems to be a common mathematical structure behind these
models. Our paper shows that the coarse matching results can be applied to this
procurement model and establishes a lower bound on the performance of n-level
contracts under much more general distributional assumptions. Hence, this paper
also sheds some light on the common mathematical structure behind these models.
Our paper develops as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the formal
model, notations and assumptions. In Section 3, we first briefly discuss the result
of McAfee (2002). Then we show that under strictly weaker conditions his result
could be extended to 2n-class coarse matching. Section 4 contains our main
theorem. Section 5 consists of three applications. Also see Appendix for details of
proofs and algebra of examples.
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3.2 The Model
A two-sided market consists of two populations of agents of equal size. For clarity,
we call the agents of each population men and women, each of whom, are
characterized by types. Denote the types as x and y respectively. Agents’ types are
randomly distributed over [0;t] where t < ¥ according to distribution functions
F (x) and G(y). Throughout the paper, we assume that corresponding density
functions f (x) and g(y) are continuous and positive over (0;t). We also assume
that F (x) and G(y) have finite variances.
Each agent is assumed to be matched with one agent from the other
category, namely, one man may only marry one woman. The payoff for matched
agents with type x and type y equals x  y. The couple shares this payoff in
proportion, e.g., they split it equally.
It is known in the literature (e.g., Becker (1973)) that if a match payoff
function exhibits complementarity in agents’ types, the optimal allocation involves
PAM i.e., the highest-type man matches the highest-type woman and the second
highest-type man matches the second highest-type woman and so on.
To interpret what follows, it is instructive to think there is a matchmaker
who can manipulate a certain type of man to match a certain type of women. The
goal of the matchmaker is to maximize the total payoff from matching. However,
to achieve PAM, the matchmaker has to know an inordinate amount of
information, i.e., the true type of each agent. Alternatively, the matchmaker can
create several locations, or sub-markets, for men and women with types belong to
a certain interval to meet at one sub-market. Within each sub-market, agents match
randomly. This matching scheme requires much less information than PAM since
the matchmaker only needs to know the interval to which an agent’s type belongs
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instead of the exact type. In Section 5.1, we discuss in detail how to implement
such a matching scheme and why it requires less information relative to PAM.
The matching rule f (x) for PAM is a function defined by
G(f (x)) = F (x) ; which specifies with whom an agent of type x is matched. The
total payoff from PAM is
u¥ =
Z t
0
xf (x)dF (x) .
By contrast, the total payoff from random matching is
u1 =
Z t
0
xdF (x)
Z t
0
ydG(y) :
Now suppose the matchmaker creates n sub-markets where men and women meet.
Within each sub-market, agents match randomly. We denote such a matching
scheme as n-class CM. For each sub-market, one to one matching requires the
same mass on both sides. Hence, given distributions F (), G() and a type range
contained in the sub-market, e.g., [a;b] and [c;d] for each category respectively, we
have F (b) F (a) = G(c) G(d). The match payoff from this sub-market is
Z b
a
x
f (x)
F (b) F (a)dx
Z d
c
y
g(y)
G(c) G(d)dy;
where f (a) = c and f (b) = d: Given cutoff points fxign 1i=1 , the total payoff for
n-class CM is
un=
n
å
i=1
(F (xi) F (xi 1))
Z xi
xi 1
x f (x)
F (xi) F (xi 1)dx
Z f(xi)
f(xi 1)
yg(y)
G(f (xi)) G(f (xi 1))dy;
where x0 = y0 = 0 and xn = yn = t . If n goes to infinity, CM becomes PAM. If
n= 1, CM is random matching. Using a change of variables, un could also be
written as
un =
n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (x)
ci  ci 1dx
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (y)
ci  ci 1dy;
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where ci = F (xi) : Throughout the paper, the cutoff points refer to three sets of
points fxign 1i=1 , fyign 1i=1 and fcign 1i=1 with yi = f (xi) and ci = F (xi) : Given
distributions F and G, any set of cutoff points could imply the other two sets.
Whenever we use un, we implicitly assume that there exists cutoff points fxign 1i=1
such that the match payoff is un:
The measure we use to evaluate the efficiency gain of an n-class CM is
un u1
u¥ u1 . (3.1)
The denominator is the total surplus of PAM over random matching. The
numerator is the surplus of an n-class matching over random matching. The payoff
difference between PAM and an n-class CM, u¥ un; can be written as
u¥ un =å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

:
Note thatR ci
ci 1
1
ci ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz  R cici 1 1ci ci 1F 1 (z)dzR cici 1 1ci ci 1G 1 (z)dz is the
surplus of PAM over random matching of one particular sub-market. Therefore,
the payoff difference u¥ un is a weighted sum of surpluses of each sub-market.
Under current payoff function xy, any non-negative and bounded type
space can be normalized to [0;1] without changing the value of (1) (see Appendix).
Therefore, henceforth, we assume that the type space is [0;1]. We can immediately
see that the efficiency gain is zero when n= 1; and the efficiency gain is one when
n goes to infinity. Intuitively, when n becomes larger, the CM scheme becomes
finer and the efficiency gain larger. Our goal is to establish a lower bound for the
efficiency gain for CM with any n classes. Such bound should be an increasing
function of n:
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3.3 An Extension of McAfee (2002)
Before we present our main theorem, it is instructive to discuss the result of
McAfee (2002). McAfee’s 2-class CM result together with our extension of his
result regarding 2n-class CM give a hint of the form of the efficiency gain for CM
with n classes. Once the main theorem for n-class CM is presented in the next
section we can also compare it to results in this section.
Theorem 3.3.1 (McAfee 2002) If for distribution functions F and G
1. F (x)= f (x) and G(y)=g(y) are both increasing,
2. [1 F (x)]= f (x) and [1 G(y)]=g(y) are decreasing,
with x1 = E (X) or f (x1) = E (Y ) : Then
u2 u1
u¥ u1 
1
2
:
The main tool used in the proof of the above theorem is Chebyshev’s
inequality. One of the difficulties McAfee mentioned that prevents him from
further extending Theorem 3.3.1 to CM with more classes is that there are no
alternatives to conditions 1 and 2. However, we show in Appendix that such
alternative conditions indeed exist when considering 2n classes that are directly
implied by conditions 1 and 2 from Theorem 3.3.1. Hence, the above theorem can
be generalized to 2n-class CM.
Theorem 3.3.2 If for distribution functions F and G
1. F (x)= f (x) and G(y)=g(y) are both increasing, and
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2. [1 F (x)]= f (x) and [1 G(y)]=g(y) are decreasing,
with x2i j =
Z x2i( j+1)
x2i( j 1)
z
F

x2i( j+1)

 F

x2i( j 1)
dF (z) or
f
 
x2i j

=
Z x2i( j+1)
x2i( j 1)
z
G

f

x2i( j+1)

 G

f

x2i( j 1)
dG(z) with
j (mod 2) 6= 0, then
u2n u1
u¥ u1  1 
1
2n
:
In this theorem, the index of the cutoff point is represented as 2i  j. In order
to ensure the uniqueness of the representation, we require that j be an odd number.
SKETCH OF THE PROOF. We prove Theorem 3.3.2 by induction. The
idea is that by doubling the number of classes the loss of efficiency gain is reduced
by half. Theorem 3.3.1 actually illustrates this point by doubling the number of
classes from n= 1; random matching, to n= 2, 2-class CM. By assuming that the
result holds for n-class CM, we want to show that the efficiency loss from 2n-class
CM is no more than half of the efficiency loss of given n-class CM. In particular,
we want to show 2(u2n un) u¥ un: As in the discussion of Section 2, the right
hand side of this inequality is a weighted sum of surpluses of PAM over random
matching of all sub-markets. Loosely speaking, we could apply Theorem 3.3.1 to
each sub-market, and then sum them together to obtain 2(u2n un) u¥ un:
One key step of the proof is to determine cutoff points. It is trivial to
conclude that if all cutoff points collapse to one end point, 0 or 1; the n-class CM
scheme becomes random matching. In the proof, to double the number of classes,
we split each interval by the conditional mean of such an interval. To generalize
the result for matching with any n classes, we need to divide one interval into
several sub-intervals. The trouble is that there is no analog rule to choose cutoff
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points to divide a given interval into more than two sub-intervals. If it exists, such
a rule would give the same cutoff points, the conditional mean, if we divide the
interval into two parts.
WEAKER CONDITIONS. Conditions in Theorem 3.3.1 are usually
referred to as hazard rate conditions. These conditions are essential to
Chebyshev’s inequality. They are sufficient but not necessary. It is possible that
the result of Theorem 3.3.1 still holds while one of these conditions is violated.
Example 3.3.1 Consider F (x) = G(x) = 1  (1  x) 14 : Since (F (x)= f (x))0 is
negative when x is close to one, condition 1 in Theorem 3.3.1 is violated. Since
[(1 F (x))= f (x)]0 = 4< 0, condition 2 in Theorem 3.3.1 is satisfied. Using the
cutoff point c= E [x] = 45 ; we calculate (u2 u1)=(u¥ u1) directly, which yields
(u2 u1)=(u¥ u1)  12 = 0:22676> 0:
In fact, hazard rate conditions in Theorem 3.3.1 can be relaxed to
incorporate the above example. By replacing Chebyshev’s inequality in the proof
of Theorem 3.3.1 with Lemma 2 (see Appendix), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.3 If for distributions F and G
1. E

F (x)
f (x)
j x< t

 E

F (x)
f (x)
j x< x1

and
E

G(y)
g(y)
j y< f (t)

 E

G(y)
g(y)
j y< f (x1)

for any t  x1
2. E

1 F (x)
f (x)
j x> t

 E

1 F (x)
f (x)
j x> x1

and
E

1 G(y)
g(y)
j y> f (t)

 E

1 G(y)
g(y)
j y> f (x1)

for any t > x1
with x1 = E (X) or f (x1) = E (Y ). Then
u2 u1
u¥ u1 
1
2
:
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The conditions in Theorem 3.3.3 are still sufficient but weaker than
conditions in Theorem 3.3.1. It is not difficult to see that conditions 1 and 2 in
Theorem 3.3.3 are implied by hazard rate conditions in Theorem 3.3.1. The next
example shows that the conditions in Theorem 3.3.3 are indeed weaker.
Example 3.3.2 Return to Example 3.3.1. We need to verify conditions in Theorem
3.3.3. Condition 2 is implied by the fact that [(1 F (x))= f (x)]0 < 0. For condition
1: we can show that E [F (x)= f (x) j x< t] E F (x)= f (x) j x< 45 when
t  45 :Therefore, Theorem 3.3.3 can be applied.
Similarly, we could also apply Lemma 2 to derive weaker conditions for
Theorem 3.3.2 to hold. But as n increases, the number of conditions to be checked
grows quickly.
3.4 Main Results
The previous section provides a result regarding 2n-class CM (as much as can be
derived using McAfee’s argument), which relies on the fixed cutoffs at the mean
and certain hazard rate conditions. In this section, we develop a different line of
attack, which provides results for n-class CM. A conjecture for n-class CM from
Theorem 3.3.2 is
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
1
n
: (3.2)
In fact, our main theorem states
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
b
n2
; (3.3)
where b is independent of n and it is only a function of the distributions.
To show that inequality (3) holds is equivalent to showing
u¥ un
u¥ u1 
b
n2
: (3.4)
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The total surplus of PAM, u¥ u1; can also be written as
u¥ u1 =
Z 1
0
(x mx)(f (x) my)dF (x)
=COV (x;f (x)) :
The last equality is due to the fact that x and f (x) are defined over the same
probability space. Then it follows the definition of covariance:
COV (x;y) =
Z Z
(x mx)(y my)dF (x;y)
=
Z
(x mx)(f (x) my)dF (x) :
If both women and men have the same distribution, the covarianceCOV (x;f (x))
degenerates to the variance. The reason to write u¥ u1 asCOV (x;f (x)) is to
highlight that such value only depends on distributions F and G:
Main Theorem
Theorem 3.4.1 is our main theorem, providing the lower bound of efficiency gain
of CM with any n classes. The lower bound is 1   b=n2 : The value of b picks
the minimum of bi corresponding to an n-class CM scheme associated with a
different vector of cutoff points. Each bi is represented in the form of p-norm.
p-norm k fk[a;b]p is defined as k fk[a;b]p =
R b
a j f (x)jp dx
 1
p for p 1 and
k fk[a;b]¥ = esssup[a;b] fj f jg. Given our assumption about densities, f (x) and g(y)
are continuous and positive over (0;1). Hence, k fk[0;1]p may go to infinity only
when f (x) goes to infinity at 0 or 1. Similarly, k1= fk[0;1]p may go to infinity only
when f (x) goes to zero.
Theorem 3.4.1 Given F and G; for each n; there exists a vector of cutoff points
(x1; :::;xn 1) such that
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
b
n2
;
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where b =minfb1;b2;b3g
1. b1 =
1
4COV (x;f (x))
2. b2 =min
8<:minp;q
F 10[0;1]p G 10[0;1]q
8COV (x;f (x))
;
F 10[0;1]¥ G 10[0;1]¥
12COV (x;f (x))
9=; ;
where 1p +
1
q = 1 and p;q 2 [1;¥]
3. b3 =min

b a3 ;b
b
3
	
;
where b a3 = minp1;q1
k fk[0;1]p1
2
p
2 [(q1+1)(2q1+1)]
1
2q1 COV (x;f (x))
;
b b3 = minp2;q2
kgk[0;1]p2
2
p
2 [(q2+1)(2q2+1)]
1
2q2 COV (x;f (x))
;
1
p j
+ 1q j = 1 and p j;q j 2 [1;¥] ; j = 1;2:
Remark 3.4.1 The cutoff points fxign 1i=1 associated with each condition are
pinned down as follows:
1. If b = b1, fxign 1i=1 should satisfy (xi  xi 1)(f (xi) f (xi 1)) = 1=n2 with
i= 1 to whenever possible up to i n 1:
2. If b = b2, fxign 1i=1 should satisfy F (xi) F (xi 1) = 1=n; where i n:
3. a) If b = b a3 , fxign 1i=1 should satisfy
(xi  xi 1)1+
1
q1 (f (xi) f (xi 1)) = (1=n)2+
1
q1 with i= 1 to whenever
possible up to i n 1:
b) If b = b b3 , fxign 1i=1 should satisfy
(xi  xi 1)(f (xi) f (xi 1))1+
1
q2 = (1=n)2+
1
q2 with i= 1 to whenever
possible up to i n 1:
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SKETCH OF THE PROOF. We sketch the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 here
(see Appendix for a complete proof). One key tool used to prove the theorem is
Gruss inequality. Unlike Chebyshev’s inequality, which only implies that the
payoff of PAM is greater than the payoff of random matching, Gruss inequality
gives the upper bound of difference in payoffs. We prove this theorem by showing
that inequality (4) holds. Since u¥ un is a weighted sum of surpluses of all
sub-markets, we prove that the surplus of each sub-market is bounded above by a
number proportional to 1=n2 by using Gruss-type inequalities. Then the weighted
sum yields the upper bound for u¥ un; which can be represented as B=n2; where
B is a fixed value. By letting b = B=COV (x;f (x)) ; we have
(u¥ un)=(u¥ u1) b=n2. Due to the different versions of Gruss inequality we
use, the value of B could be different as could be the value of b . Hence, we choose
the minimum among all possible values of b .
Given the number of classes n, the optimal n-class CM yields the highest
payoff by choosing cutoffs optimally. Such optimal n-class CM usually involves
solving for a quite complex programming problem and is not informative once n
has changed. Cutoff points fxign 1i=1 from the above theorem need not be chosen
optimally nor be the same as cutoff points in Theorem 3.3.2 when restricted to 2m
classes. The lower bound is tight if cutoffs from Theorem 3.4.1 coincide with
cutoffs of optimal CM.
The choice of cutoff points is important for Theorem 3.4.1 to hold. To be
more specific, it is critical for us to represent the upper bound of u¥ un as a
function of 1=n2. The reason is that the size of each sub-market is determined by
cutoff points. The larger the size of the sub-market, the larger the efficiency loss
due to the mismatch within such a sub-market. If all cutoff points concentrate
together, the efficiency gain from CM is close to the efficiency gain from random
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matching. Therefore, we need to spread cutoff points to keep a proper size of each
sub-market so that efficiency loss can be bounded by a number proportional to
1=n2. The reason we can do this relies on the assumption that the type space is
bounded. As a consequence, the weighted sum of those efficiency losses is
bounded by a function of 1=n2:
Three forms of bi are given to ensure the tightness of the lower bound.
Generally speaking, b1 performs relatively well if distributions are symmetric. b2
utilizes information of 1= f and 1=g. Hence, if densities could achieve very large
value or go to infinity, b2 performs better than other two forms. The third form b3
uses f and g directly. Hence, if densities go to some small value, b3 would be
better.
Benefits of Theorem 3.4.1 include that 1) in order to evaluate the
performance of n-class CM, people do not need to know anything about cutoff
points to derive the lower bound for efficiency gain; 2) the value of b only depends
on distributions; 3) the lower bound is tight, which is shown in Example 3.4.1; 4)
instead of solving for the optimal n-level CM scheme, cutoff points from Remark
3.4.1 provide a much easier way to find an n-level CM scheme with efficiency gain
no less than the lower bound.
Note that although given certain distributions, b2, b3 may go to infinity, b1
is always finite. Therefore, b is always a finite number. This fact guarantees that
the lower bound is meaningful at least when n is large enough. Comparing the
lower bound derived in Theorem 3.4.1 to inequality (2), it is obvious that Theorem
3.4.1 is better if b  n in the sense that the lower bound is larger. Since b is fixed
over n, there exists an n such that Theorem 3.4.1 is better for all n> n. This fact
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gives us a way to compare Theorem 3.4.1 and Theorem 3.3.2 when we restrict
ourselves to a non-negative and bounded type space with 2m classes. When m is
large enough, the lower bound from Theorem 3.4.1 is tighter. Especially if b is
less than 2, Theorem 3.4.1 is better from m= 1: For this reason, we are
particularly interested in comparing b to 2 later on:Moreover, Theorem 3.4.1
holds with much more general conditions on distribution functions.
To apply Theorem 3.4.1, we need to go through all possible values of all
bis to pick the minimum, which often requires a large amount of calculations. The
value of one particular bi is often good enough. By sacrificing tightness slightly,
focusing on one particular bi with a particular value of pi decreases the amount of
calculations dramatically: Furthermore, if the distributions behave ”nicely”
enough, we can derive the lower bound in a much easier way. The following
corollary is developed to illustrate this point. If densities are bounded from zero,
then instead of utilizing detailed information about the density, the corollary only
involves those bounds. Therefore, the calculation of the lower bound is simplified.
Certainly, the lower bounds could potentially be improved if we employed the
much more complex Theorem 3.4.1.
Corollary 3.4.1 The lower bound of efficiency gain
un u1
u¥ u1 is:
1. 1  1
4an2
if COV (x;f (x)) a,
2. 1 
p
3AB
3
2
n2
if densities satisfy f (x) A;g(x) B;
3. 1  a
2b2
n2
if densities satisfy f (x) 1=a and g(x) 1=b,
4. 1  1
n2
AB
ab
if densities a f (x) A and b g(y) B,
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Lower bound 1 of above corollary is simply a direct implication from b1 in
Theorem 3.4.1. In particular, if f (x) = g(x) ;COV (x;f (x)) becomes the variance
s2x : Then the larger the variance, the larger the lower bound. Roughly speaking,
this result indicates that the higher the variation, the less the efficiency loss. Lower
bound 2-4 provide large lower bounds as long as densities don’t vary dramatically.
Now we apply the above corollary to the following simple example.
Example 3.4.1 Consider F (x) = G(x) = x. Density equals 1. By Corollary 3.4.1,
we have (un u1)=(u¥ u1) 1 1=n2: In fact, the lower bound is tight. The
highest efficiency gain can that be achieved by an n-level CM scheme is 1 1=n2.
Corollary 3.4.1 provides an easier way to derive lower bounds by
employing less information on distributions. The tradeoff then is the sacrifice of
tightness of the lower bound. In Example 3.4.2, we apply part of Theorem 3.4.1,
which gives a better bound than the above corollary.
Example 3.4.2 Suppose F (x) = G(x) = 1pe 1e
1
2x  1pe 1 with x 2 [0;1]. Then
f (x) = 12
1p
e 1e
1
2x 2
h
1
2
1p
e 1 ;
1
2
1p
e 1e
1
2
i
and F 1 (x) = 2log((
p
e 1)x+1). It is
easy to check that none of the bounds derived from Corollaries 4.1 are less than 2.
We now derive the bound using b2 with p= q= ¥. We have b2 = 1:7045< 2.
Hence, (un u1)=(u¥ u1)> 1 2=n2:
The value of b1 in Theorem 3.4.1 can be improved if the inverse functions
of F and G are totally (completely) monotonic or absolutely monotonic. A
function f (x) is totally (completely) monotonic if ( 1)n f (n) (x) 0 for all
n= 0;1;2; :::: A function f (x) is absolutely monotonic if it has nonnegative
derivatives of all orders.
63
Corollary 3.4.2 For any F and G,
b1 =
1
12COV (x;f (x))
if F 1 and G 1 are totally (completely) monotonic or
b1 =
4
45COV (x;f (x))
if F 1 and G 1 are absolutely monotonic.
Example 3.4.3 For distributions F (x) = G(x) = x
1
a defined over [0;1] with
integer a greater than 1, the inverse function F 1 (x) = xa is absolutely
monotonic. The value of COV (x;x) = a
2
(a+1)2(2a+1)
 245 when a = 1; ::;8. By
Corollary 3.4.1; b1 = 445COV (x;x)  2 when a = 1; ::;8:
The value of b from Theorem 3.4.1 depends on distributions. If b is too
large, the lower bound is meaningless for CM with small n: As we discussed
above, the value of b depends on the symmetry of distributions. In the following
example we consider distributions F (x) = G(x) = x
1
a ; where a 2 (0;¥) ; and
show that b  3 for any a . Therefore, the lower bound implied by Theorem 3.4.1
is useful. The reason we are interested in this class of distributions is that as a
changes this class covers both symmetric and asymmetric distributions. If a = 1,
the distributions are uniform and symmetric. If a is closed to 0 or ¥, the
distributions are highly asymmetric. We believe this example suggests that in
general b from Theorem 3.4.1 cannot be too large. The following example also
illustrates the advantage of Theorem 3.4.1 over Theorem 3.3.1 and 3.3.2:
Example 3.4.4 Consider a class of distributions F (x) = G(x) = x
1
a over [0;1]
where a 2 (0;¥).
(i) From Theorem 3.3.2, condition 1 and 2 are satisfied only if a  1.
Therefore, for a 2 (0;1] we have
u2m u1
u¥ u1  1 
1
2m
:
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(ii) In this case, simply applying Theorem 3.4.1 won’t give a tight lower
bound over all a : Special treatment is needed. We show in Appendix that by
adapting the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we can derive the following result:
u2 u1
u¥ u1 
1
2
and
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
3
n2
for any a 2 (0;¥) and n 3.
Compared to the lower bound derived from part (i), part (ii) provides a
tighter bound when restricted to a  1 and the number of classes equals 2m:
Furthermore, it provides a bound for any a 2 (0;¥) and any number of classes.
MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE. Ratio un=u¥ is also used as a measure
of the performance of CM in the literature. As we show in Appendix, when the
match payoff function is xy, ratio (un u1)=(u¥ u1) is convenient since its value
is not affected by shifting the type space while un=u¥ is: For a general match
payoff function u(x;y), ratio (un u1)=(u¥ u1) may lose such advantage due to
the curvature of u(x;y) : Depending on interest, it is sometimes also more sensible
to use un=u¥ as a measure of the performance of CM. In fact, Theorem 3.4.1 is
enough to establish a lower bound for un=u¥: Because
un u1
u¥ u1  1 b=n
2 implies
that
un
u¥
 1 b=n2. If we replace COV (x;f (x)) in b with u¥; a tighter lower
bound for un=u¥ is obtained. Note that u¥ only depends on distributions F and G:
General match payoff Function
We derive all previous results by assuming that the match payoff function is simply
x  y. However, those results can be easily generalized to matching with payoff
function m(x)n(y) ; where m() and n() are continuous monotonic functions.
Treat F (x(m)) and G(y(n)) as new distribution functions w.r.t. m and n; where
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x(m) and y(n) are inverse function of m(x) and n(y) : Then the payoff function
becomes mn. Hence all previous results hold if the payoff function is separable.
In general, there is no reason why the payoff function should be separable.
But results regarding general payoff functions are rarely seen in related literature.
We show below that the main result extends if a condition imposed jointly on the
payoff function and on the densities holds
Formally, we consider matching with a general payoff function u(x;y) ;
which is complementary in x and y. Due to the curvature of u(x;y) ; we are no
longer able to assume that the type space is [0;1] without loss of generality. Here,
we assume the type space [a;b] is nonnegative and bounded:
We have the following similar notations for match payoff of random
matching and PAM:
u1 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

dadb
u¥ =
Z 1
0
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

da:
Theorem 3.4.2 For c.d.f. F;G defined over a non-negative bounded type space
[a;b] with
¶ 2
¶x¶y
u
 
F 1 (x) ;G 1 (y)
 2 A;A, we have
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
b
n2
;
where b = A=A: The cutoff points are fcigni=1 such that ci = i=n:
The condition required in Theorem 3.4.2
¶ 2
¶x¶y
u
 
F 1 (x) ;G 1 (y)

equals
u21=( f g). The value of u21 characterizes the degree of complementarity of the
match payoff function in matched agents’ types. This condition indicates that a
lower bound exists if the degree of complementarity together with the reciprocal of
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densities are bounded away from zero and infinity. The lower bound is large if
u21=( f g) doesn’t vary significantly over the type space.
To illustrate Theorem 3.4.2 consider the following example:
Example 3.4.5 Suppose u(x;y) = e
1
4 xy and x and y are uniformly distributed over
[0;1]. Then u
 
F 1 (x) ;G 1 (y)

= e
1
4xy. It’s easy to check that
u21F 10G 10 = 116e
1
4 xy (xy+4) 2
h
1
4 ;
5
16e
1
4
i
and b = A=A= 1:605. By Theorem
3.4.2, we have
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
1:605
n2
:
In Appendix, we provide two more technical conditions for the result in
Theorem 3.4.2 to hold.
3.5 Applications
All of our results so far are derived under a canonical matching model assuming
the matchmaker can at least obtain coarse information of agents’ types. As we
mention in the introduction, in practice, agents may have incentive to misreport
their types. For example, in the monopolistic pricing model, a monopolist could
produce products with various qualities and sell them to consumers with different
valuations that are privately known. It is well known that to maximize its profit,
the monopolist can design an optimal contract to provide agents incentives to
report honestly. Under such an optimal contract, the consumer with the highest
valuation chooses the product with the highest quality and so on. From the
practical point of view, seldom does a firm adopt such an optimal contract by
offering a product with different quality for each consumer. Instead, a firm usually
offers a simple contract with products possessing only several different qualities
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that target different groups of consumers. In the same spirit of coarse matching,
we are interested in the performance of such ”simple contracts”.
We start this section with a matching model with private information. We
illustrate how to implement coarse matching when agents’ types are only known to
themselves. We then turn our attention to contracting models. The first to be
examined is a monopolistic pricing model, which is a pure adverse selection
model. The second is a cost-sharing model, which has both private information
and hidden actions.
Coarse Matching with Private Information
In this application, we discuss how to implement coarse matching with private
information. Consider the previous marriage model with individual’s type
privately known to themselves. Assume that the match couple shares the payoff xy
equally. The setting is quite similar to Damiano and Li (2007). However, instead
of revenue, as a social planner, the matchmaker cares about the total payoff from
matching which is a sum over all payoffs of individuals and transfers between
individuals and the matchmaker.
Given the number of classes adopted by the matchmaker, our CM results
provide a lower bound of the efficiency gain of n-class CM with perfect
information. Next we show that the same lower bound of the efficiency gain can be
derived for n-class coarse matching. To implement a particular n-class CM scheme
given distributions of individuals’ types, the matchmaker creates n sub-markets for
individuals with types belonging to different intervals. Individuals within each
sub-market match randomly. The cutoffs of types of each sub-market is public
announced by the matchmaker. Hence, any individual has an expectation of
payoffs from participating different sub-markets. Denote cutoffs men and women
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associated with ith sub-market as fxi 1;xig and fyi 1;yig respectively with
yi = f (xi) and i= 1; :::;n: Also denote the participation fees for men and women
for ith sub-market are pmi and p
w
i respectively. The matchmaker could induce
individuals to choose right sub-markets by setting participation fees properly. A
fee schedule fpmi ; pni gni=1 is incentive compatible for men with type x 2 [xi 1;xi]
and women with type y 2 [f (xi 1) ;f (xi)] ifZ yi
yi 1
xy
G(yi) G(yi 1)dG(y)  p
m
i 
Z y j
y j 1
xy
G
 
y j
 G y j 1dG(y)  pmjZ xi
xi 1
xy
F (xi) F (xi 1)dF (x)  p
w
i 
Z x j
x j 1
xy
F
 
x j
 F  x j 1dF (x)  pwj :
Such fee schedule indeed exists. For illustration, suppose a matchmaker
adopts a 2-class CM. To implement, the matchmaker creates two locations in
which men and women to meet, one for individuals with types above thresholds x
and y (high type) and the other one for individuals with types below x and y
(low type). Now men and women who want to participate the high type location
will be charged fees pm and pw respectively. It is free to participate in the low type
location. Knowing they will match some individuals with high (low) type by
participating in high (low) type locations, they will pay the following fees
pm =
1
2
Z 1
y
xy
1 G(y)dG(y) 
1
2
Z y
0
xy
G(y)
dG(y)
pw =
1
2
Z 1
x
xy
1 F (x)dF (x) 
1
2
Z x
0
xy
F (x)
dF (x) ;
which are incentive compatible. All men and women with types above (below) x
and y respectively will participate in high (low) type locations. Since transfers
between individuals and the matchmaker don’t affect overall payoffs from CM,
2-class CM can be implemented. Alternatively, we could interpret those
individuals who are willing to pay fees as being premium members, with the
matchmaker only introducing premium members to premium members. It is the
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same procedure to implement CM with any number of classes, even PAM, by
charging fees continuously for each type. The reasons why a matchmaker may
prefer CM to PAM may be 1) there is a cost for creating more locations for
individuals to meet or alternatively, it is costly to introduce a new tier of
membership; 2) the welfare concern of individuals means that to implement PAM
the matchmaker has to take a large share of total payoff away from individuals.
In sum, the efficiency gain of n-class CM with private information of
individuals’ types can be bounded below by 1 b=n2 from Theorem 3.4.1.
Monopolistic Pricing
In this application, we consider a textbook monopoly pricing model. Under
standard assumptions, the optimal contract offered by the monopolist induces a
consumer with a higher valuation to buy a product with a higher quality and pay a
higher price continuously. This sorting result can be thought of as PAM between a
consumer’s type and product’s quality. It is natural to interpret CM with n classes
in this setting as an n-level contract consisting of products with n different
qualities for n groups of consumers, which induces each group of consumers with
valuations within an interval to buy products with the same quality and pay for the
same price. Given the number of different qualities the monopolist could produce,
the monopolist could change the size of each group of consumers by choosing
cutoffs of consumers’ valuations to maximize its profit. The natural question to
ask is how to apply our previous CM result to evaluate the performance of optimal
n-level contracts relative to the optimal contracts.
Unlike our original canonical matching model where the incentive
compatibility (IC henceforth) and participation (IR henceforth) conditions are
absent, in this model, the payoff of the optimal contract and optimal n-level
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contract are twisted differently away from the product of consumer’s valuation and
product’s quality due to different numbers of IC and IR conditions faced by the
monopolist. Therefore, the connection between n-level contracts and the optimal
contract is not as simple as the connection between n-class CM and PAM. It is not
straightforward to apply CM results here to obtain the profit gain (analog to the
efficiency gain) of the optimal n-level contract. To overcome the difficulty caused
by IC and IR conditions, we first treat the payoff of the optimal contract as PAM
then apply CM results mechanically to this payoff, which implies the lower bound
of n-class CM. Note, n-class CM derived here is based on the optimal contract’s
payoff, which is generated endogenously taking IC conditions into account. It
does not correspond to any n-level contract directly. To link n-class CM and
n-level contract, in the second step, we construct an n-level (feasible) contract that
satisfies IC and IR conditions. The profit gain of such a feasible contract can be
bounded below by the lower bound of n-class CM derived in the first step. Since
the optimal n-level contract should have a (weakly) higher profit than any feasible
n-level contract, the lower bound derived in the first step, therefore, is the lower
bound of the profit gain for the optimal n-level contract.
PROBLEM FORMULATION. A monopolist seller could choose to
produce a product with quality a at cost c a. The buyer’s utility from such a good
is assumed to be qu(a) ; where q is this buyer’s type privately known to herself
and u(a) is an increasing concave function of quality a. Type q is randomly
distributed over [0;1] with c.d.f. Fˆ (q). The monopolist maximizes its profit by
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solving the following problem:
max
a(q);t(q)
Z 1
0
[t (q)  ca(q)]dFˆ (q)
s.t qu(a(q))  t (q) qu a q 0  t  q 0 for any q ;q 0 2 [0;1] (IC)
qu(a(q))  t (q) 0 for any q 2 [0;1] (IR) :
THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT. It is standard to assume that 
1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q) is a decreasing function. Then by using standard procedures,
we can solve for the optimal contract. Denote the optimal contract as a (q) ;
which specifies the quality of the product a buyer gets if his valuation is q . The
monopolist’s profit is
p¥ =
Z 1
q

q   1  Fˆ (q)
fˆ (q)

u(a (q))dFˆ (q)| {z }
revenue
 
Z 1
q
ca (q)dFˆ (q)| {z }
cost
;
where q satisfies q    1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q) = 0:
COARSE MATCHING. Let j (q) =

q    1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q) : Denote
revenue under the optimal contract as R¥ which can be written as
R¥ =
Z 1
q
j (q)u(a (q))dFˆ (q) :
Since both j (q) and u(a (q)) are increasing, R¥ can be thought of as PAM
between “agents” with types j (q) and u(a (q)). Denote the inverse function of
j (q) as j 1 (x). Then revenue R¥ can be written asR 1
0 xu
 
a
 
j 1 (x)

dFˆ
 
j 1 (x)

:We then apply Theorem 3.4.1 directly to R¥ to
derive a lower bound for (Rn R1)=(R¥ R1): Here Rn is defined as
Rn =å

1
F (j 1 (xi)) F (j 1 (xi 1))
Z xi
xi 1
xdFˆ
 
j 1 (x)


Z xi
xi 1
u
 
a
 
j 1 (x)

dFˆ
 
j 1 (x)

:
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By letting pn = Rn 
R 1
q ca
 (q)dFˆ (q) ; we have equality
(Rn R1)=(R¥ R1) = (pn p1)=(p¥ p1): Note that Rn and pn do not have any
economic meaning in this setting thus far. Both Rn and pn are numbers implied by
Theorem 3.4.1.
CONNECTION TO n-LEVEL CONTRACTS. Our goal is to establish a
lower bound for the profit gain of the optimal n-level contract. Denote the profit
under the optimal n-level contract as pn . We want to utilize the lower bound of
(Rn R1)=(R¥ R1) derived above to establish a lower bound for
(pn  p1)=(p¥ p1). This can be achieved if we can show that pn is not less than
pn.
Let pn be the profit from an n-level contract satisfying both IC and IR
conditions. By definition, the profit of the optimal n-level contract pn is no less
than pn. In order to do a comparison, we need show that there indeed exists an
n-level contract that satisfies IC and IR conditions under which the monopolist has
profit equal to pn. We show this by construction. Consider an n-level stochastic
contract offered by the monopolist such that a consumer with type q 2 [qi 1;qi]
gets a product with quality randomly distributed according to ai (x) = a (x) where
x is randomly distributed over [qi 1;qi] by Fˆ (x) and fqigni=1 are cutoff points
associated with Rn: By offering products with stochastic qualities within certain
intervals and charging fix prices, the monopolist could induce consumers to buy
products targeted to their types. We claim such a contract satisfies IC and IR
conditions (hence implementable), and it has profit equal to pn (see Appendix): In
fact, this n-level contract also has revenue equal to Rn.
RESULT. To apply Theorem 3.4.1, define F (x) = Fˆ
 
j 1 (x)

;
G
 
u
 
a
 
j 1 (x)

= F (x) and f (x) = u
 
a
 
j 1 (x)

. Let C = f (1) f (0).
Now distributions F () and G() are defined over [0;1] and [f (0) ;f (1)]. By
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adapting the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 (pn  p1)=(p¥ p1) 1 C
 
b=n2

where
b is the same as in Theorem 3.4.1. However, unlike in the canonical matching
model, (pn  p1)=(p¥ p1) may not be a natural measure for the profit gain of the
optimal n-level contract. On the contrary, measure pn=p¥ captures the fraction of
the profit that can be generated from the optimal n-level contract relative to the
optimal contract. By the logic of the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, with a little
modification, we have the following result regarding pn=p¥:
Proposition 3.5.1 The profit of the optimal n-level contract pn satisfies
pn
p¥
 1  bˆ
n2
;
where bˆ =min
n
bˆ1; bˆ2; bˆ3
o
1. bˆ1 =
C
4p¥
2. bˆ2 =
Cmin
8<:minp;q
F 10[0;1]p G 10[f(0);f(1)]q
8p¥
;
F 10[0;1]¥ G 10[f(0);f(1)]¥
12p¥
9=; ;
where 1p +
1
q = 1 and p;q 2 [1;¥]
3. bˆ3 =min
n
bˆ a3 ; bˆ
b
3
o
;
where bˆ a3 = minp1;q1
Ck fk[0;1]p1
2
p
2 [(q1+1)(2q1+1)]
1
2q1 p¥
;
bˆ b3 = minp2;q2
Ckgk[f(0);f(1)]p2
2
p
2 [(q2+1)(2q2+1)]
1
2q2 p¥
;
1
p j
+ 1q j = 1 and p j;q j 2 [1;¥] ; j = 1;2:
To illustrate this proposition, we apply it to the following example.
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Example 3.5.1 Consumer’s utility function is qu(a) = qa
1
2 : The c.d.f. of
valuation is Fˆ (q) = qa over [0;1]. Then the optimal contract is
a(q) = j2 (q)=4c2; where j (q) =
 
q    1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q). The revenue under
the optimal contract is R¥ = 12c
R 1
q j2 (q)dF (q). Hence,
F (x) = G(x) = Fˆ
 
j 1 (x)

:We have R¥ = 12c
R 1
0 x
2dF (x) : For illustration, we
simply choose bˆ a3 with p1 = ¥ from the previous proposition
b a3 =
p
3k fk[0;1]¥
12p¥
:
We can show that b3  2; for any a 2 [1;20]. Therefore, for any a 2 [1;20];
pn
p¥
 1  2
n2
:
WITHOUT THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT. To derive bˆ for the profit gain
of an optimal n-level contract, we need to know the entire function of the optimal
contract a (q) : However, the closed form of a (q) is usually difficult or
impossible to derive. Now the question is, how do we know the gain of profit
recovered by an optimal n-level contract if we don’t have the optimal contract? In
this part, we consider an alternative to solving the optimal contract.
By observing bˆ in the above proposition, both C and p¥ are related to
optimal contract a (q). However,C = u(a (1)) u(a (q)) ; which depends on
the value of a (q) at only two points, a (1) and a (q). Furthermore, from the
conditions that the optimal contract need to satisfy, we could imply that a (q) = 0
and u0 (a (1)) = c: Hence, once the form of u() is known, the value of a (1) can
be solved immediately. By contrast, the value of p¥ is determined by the entire
function a (q). Denote the value of bˆ by replacing p¥ with p2 as b˜ ; where p

2 the
profit of the optimal 2-level contract: Since the optimal 2-level contract only
involves two IC conditions, it is easy to derive p2 . Furthermore, p

2  p¥ implies
that b˜  bˆ : Therefore, pn=p¥  1  b˜=n2:
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To illustrate the above discussion, we consider the same example as
Example 3.5.1 with a = 1.
Example 3.5.2 For Example 3.5.1 with a = 1; It is easy to solve for an optimal
2-level contract that has profit p2 =
1
25c : Based on previous discussion, for
simplicity, let b˜ be bˆ1 with p¥ replacing by p2 . Hence, b˜ = u(a
 (1))=(4p2 ). That
is u(a (1)) = 1=(2c). Therefore, b˜ = 25=8:
Hence,
pn
p¥
 1  b˜
n2
:
Cost-Sharing
In the cost-sharing model, a principal wants to procure a product from a firm. The
cost of production for the firm is randomly distributed. The firm could reduce the
initial cost by exerting effort and bearing some disutility. Both initial cost and
effort are unobservable to the principal. The principal only observes realized cost.
Compared to the monopolistic pricing model, this model includes both adverse
selection and hidden actions. Laffont and Tirole (1986) studied this model in a
very general setting. They completely solved the problem for the optimal contract
containing a continuum of items. However, Rogerson (2003) argued that such a
contract was not widely used due to its complexity. He then studied this model
within a very restrictive environment and showed that a ”simple contract”
performs relatively well in terms of cost. Chu and Sappington (2007) followed this
idea. They analyzed the same cost-sharing model as Rogerson (2003) under a
slightly more general class of distributions. They provided a different ”simple
contract” and showed that such contract could often outperform the one used in
Rogerson (2003) under different distributions.
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The ”simple contract” in these two papers refers to a 2-level contract,
which is a combination of two of the following three contracts: fixed price (FP)
contract, cost reimbursement (CR) contract and linear cost sharing (LCS) contract.
Under a FP contract, the principal pays a fixed price for the product regardless the
realized cost. Under a CR contract, the principal pays the realized cost to the firm.
Under an LCS contract, the principal pays a lump-sum payment and shares a fixed
fraction of the realized cost. In Rogerson (2003), the ”simple contract” is a 2-level
contract which has FP and CR. In Chu and Sappington (2007), the ”simple
contract” is a 2-level contract containing LCS and CR.
We consider the same cost-sharing model as Rogerson (2003) and Chu and
Sappington (2007) with much more general distributions. Unlike the previous two
papers, we want to evaluate the performance of n-level contracts. To apply CM
results to this model, we have the same difficulty as in the monopolistic pricing
case due to feasibility (IC and IR) conditions required for n-level contracts. PAM
is generated endogenously under the optimal contract. The CM scheme, in
general, is not a feasible contract. By the same logic as in monopoly pricing, to
apply our CM results, we construct a ”simple contract” that can be bounded by the
lower bound derived from CM result. Moreover, such contract is feasible. The
”simple contract” to be analyzed is an n-level linear cost sharing cost
reimbursement (LCSCR) contract. Such a contract contains n items with n 1
different LCS items and one CR item.
To derive the lower bound of the efficiency gain for the optimal n-level
LCSCR contract, we first formulate this problem and solve for the optimal contract
enabling us to see the sorting feature in the principal’s value function. Due to
sorting, we can apply our CM results and establish a lower bound. In the end, we
show that this lower bound is indeed a lower bound of the efficiency gain of a
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feasible n-level LCSCR contract.
MODEL DESCRIPTION. A risk-neutral principal wants to buy a unit of
product from a firm. The firm’s initial cost of production is a random variable
following a c.d.f. F (x) over [0;1]. The firm could exert effort y to reduce the initial
cost, and the disutility of effort is 14ky
2. Such an effort could not be observed by the
principal. The principal could only observe the realized cost, which is c= x  y.
Since the firm’s initial cost is private information, the contract should satisfy both
IC and IR conditions. The goal of the principal is to offer a feasible contract that
minimize expected transfer to the firm.
THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT. Following the standard procedure
developed in Laffont and Tirole (1986), we have y(x) = 0 if F (x)= f (x) 2k and
y(x) = 2k  (F (x)= f (x)) if F (x)= f (x) 2k (see Appendix). Function
F (x)= f (x) is usually assumed to be an increasing function. Hence, the effort y(x)
is decreasing in x and bounded below by zero.
Denote x =minffx;1gj [F (x)= f (x)] = 2k:g. The expected transfer to the
firm is
mx  k
Z x
0

1
2k
F (x)
f (x)
 1
2
dF (x)| {z }
cost reduction
:
Under a CR contract, the principal pays the firm for the observed cost. It is easy to
check that a CR contract is feasible, and under this contract the firm exerts no
effort and the expected cost for the principal is mx. Hence, the second term
k
R x
0 [1 F (x)=2k f (x)]2
dF (x) is the cost reduction from the CR contract. The objective of the principal is
equivalent to finding a contract that maximizes cost reduction. Under any contract,
the expected transfer to the firm can be represented as mx subtracting an amount of
cost reduction. The performance of a ”simple contract” then can be measured by
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the amount of cost reduction.
COARSE MATCHING. Denote cost reduction under the optimal contract
as u¥: That is u¥ = k
R x
0 [1 F (x)=2k f (x)]2 dF (x). Note that u¥ can be viewed
as PAM between “agents” with two identical types F (x)=2k f (x) 1: As in
monopoly pricing model, we could apply CM results to u¥ and provide a lower
bound of (un 1 u1)=(u¥ u1). Here,
un 1 = k
n 1
å
i=1
1
F (xi) F (xi 1)
Z xi
xi 1
[F (x)=2k f (x) 1]dF (x)
2
;
where x0 = 0, xn 1 = x and fxig are determined by the main theorem: Note un 1
again is the a value implied by the CM result and has no meaning in this model
thus far.
CONNECTION TO THE n-LEVEL CONTRACT. In order to use the
lower bound of (un 1 u1)=(u¥ u1) to evaluate the performance of the optimal
n-level contract, we need to show that there exists a feasible n-level contract which
has the amount of cost reduction equals to un 1. The n-level contract we analyze is
an n-level LCSCR contract, where the first n 1 items are n 1 different LCS
contracts for the firm with type less than x and the last is a CR contract for the
firm with type greater than x. The reason such an n-level contract has cost
reduction equal to un 1 is because the CR part of an n-level LCSCR contract
provides no cost reduction.
We prove the existence by construction. The principal offers an n-level
LCSCR contract that has LCS contract fTi;aig if i n 1 and CR contract if
i= n. faign 1i=1 are chosen to satisfy
(1 ai)2 = 1F (xi) F (xi 1)
Z xi
xi 1

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
2
,
where fxign 1i=1 are the same as the cutoff point for un 1. Lump-sum transfers
fTign 1i=1 can be solved recursively so that IC and IR conditions can be satisfied.
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Therefore, the n-level LCSCR contract we constructed is feasible. Moreover, the
cost reduction of this n-level contract is the same as un 1. Hence, the value of un 1
can be treated as the cost reduction of some n-level LCSCR contract. Note that
such an n-level LCSCR contract needs not be optimal.
THE OPTIMAL n-LEVEL LCSCR CONTRACT. So far we have
established the lower bound for (un 1 u1)=(u¥ u1) and showed that there
exists a feasible n-level LCSCR under which the cost reduction is un 1. By
definition, the optimal n-level LCSCR contract should provide a weakly higher
cost reduction denoted as un 1. The lower bound of (un 1 u1)=(u¥ u1) then is
a lower bound of
 
un 1 u1

=(u¥ u1) :
Similarly to monopoly pricing model, un 1=u¥ here is a more sensible
measure, which captures the fraction of cost reduction can be achieved by the
optimal n-level LCSCR contract of the optimal contract. We could derive an
analog result to Proposition 3.5.1. For simplicity, by using the proof of b1 in
Theorem 3.4.1, we show the following result.
Proposition 3.5.2 If F(x)f (x) is increasing, the cost reduction of the optimal n-level
LCSCR contract un 1 satisfies u

n 1=u¥  1 b=(n 1)2 ; where b =
k
4u¥
:
Rogerson (2003) shows that with uniform distribution an optimal two-level
FPCR contract has (u1=u¥) 0:75. Chu and Sappington (2007) shows that under
a c.d.f. F (x) =

x x
x x
a
; where a 2 [0;¥) an optimal 2-level LCSCR has
u1=u¥  2=e 0:73.
By restricting ourselves to distributions used in above two papers, our
results may not outperform their lower bounds. Because our results are derived for
much more general environments and for contracts with any number of levels. On
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the contrary, under specific forms of distributions, the optimal two-level contracts
can be solved. Hence, tighter lower bounds can be provided.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the efficiency gain of n-class CM of two-sided markets with
heterogeneous agents relative to the optimal matching scheme that requires PAM.
We revisited McAfee (2002) and showed that his result extends in an intuitive yet
non-obvious way to 2n classes. But the same method cannot be applied to further
extend the result to CM with n classes. We then developed a completely different
method, one that involves a novel use of some powerful inequalities. Our first
main result provides a lower bound on the efficiency gain of CM for suitable
n-class partitions of the populations. Furthermore, the distributions required are
very mild, as they only need to have finite variance and continuous densities over a
non-negative bounded interval. The second main result of the paper provides an
extension to more general payoff functions that are supermodular in the agents’
characteristics, so long as a condition that involves both the payoff function and
the distributions of attributes is satisfied. In the end, we showed that there are
several problems seemingly unrelated to matching in which our results can be
fruitfully applied. We illustrated this by adapting the coarse matching results to
models like monopoly pricing problem and cost-sharing problem so as to evaluate
the performance of pooling contracts that are easy implemented relative to optimal
contracts. Compared to the results from Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington
(2007) regarding the cost-sharing problem, our results hold for contracts with any
n levels under much more general conditions of distributions. This application also
sheds some light on the comments made in Rogerson (2003) about the common
mathematical structure behind the matching and cost-sharing models.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF AND OMITTED STEPS OF CHAPTER 3
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Normalization of Type Space
In this part, we show that if the match payoff is xy, any non-negative and bounded
type space [a;b] can be normalized to [0;1] without affecting the value of
(un u1)=(u¥ u1). It’s easy to see that the length of the type space can be
assumed to be one without loss of generality.
Define
ua¥ =
Z a+1
a
xf˜ (x)dF˜ (x) ; ua1 =
Z a+1
a
xdF˜ (x)
Z a+1
a
ydG˜(y)
uan =
n
å
i=1
1
F (xi) F (xi 1)
Z xi
xi 1
xdF˜ (x)
Z f(xi)
f(xi 1)
ydG˜(y) :
Here, for any x;y 2 [a;a+1], F˜ (x) = F (x a) and G˜(y) = G(y a) and
G(f (x a)) = G˜ f˜ (x). Therefore, f˜ (x) = f (x a)+a:
Lemma 1
ua¥ uan
ua¥ ua1
=
u0¥ u0n
u0¥ u01
.
Proof. For x;y 2 [a+1;b+1] ; F˜ (x) = F (x 1), G˜(y) = G(y 1) ;
F (x) = G(f (x)) and G(f (x 1)) = G˜ f˜ (x). Hence, f˜ (x) = f (x 1)+1:
To prove the lemma, it is enough to prove the following equality:
Z b
a
xf (x)dF (x)  1
F (b) F (a)
Z b
a
xdF (x)
Z b
a
ydG(y)
=
Z b+1
a+1
xf˜ (x)dF˜ (x)  1
F˜ (b+1)  F˜ (a+1)
Z b+1
a+1
xdF˜ (x)
Z b+1
a+1
ydG˜(y) ;
where b a 1:
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To show it,
Z b+1
a+1
xf˜ (x)dF˜ (x)  1
F˜ (b+1)  F˜ (a+1)
Z b+1
a+1
xdF˜ (x)
Z b+1
a+1
xdG˜(x)
=
Z b
a
(y+1) f˜ (y+1)dF (x)  1
F (b) F (a)
Z b
a
(y+1)dF (y)
Z b
a
(y+1)dG(y)
=
Z b
a
(y+1)(f (y)+1)dF (x)  1
F (b) F (a)
Z b
a
(y+1)dF (y)
Z b
a
(y+1)dG(y)
=
Z b
a
xf (x)dF (x)+
Z b
a
f (x)dF (x)+
Z b
a
xdF (x)+
Z b
a
1dF (x)
  1
b a
Z b
a
xdF (x)
Z b
a
xdG(x) 
Z b
a
xdG(x) 
Z b
a
xdF (x) 
Z b
a
1dF (x)
=
Z b
a
xf (x)dF (x)  1
b a
Z b
a
xdF (x)
Z b
a
xdG(x) :
If the type space is an arbitrary interval [a;b], we can redefine F˜ (x) = F
  x a
b a

and
G˜(y) = G
  y a
b a

: Then the same argument goes through.
From the above proof, one could immediately see that ratio
ua1
ua¥
=
R 1
0
 
F 1 (z)+a

dz
R 1
0
 
G 1 (z)+a

dzR 1
0 (F 1 (z)+a)(G 1 (z)+a)dz
is not immune to the shift of domain. In fact, by letting a go to infinity, ua1=u
a
¥ goes
to 1.
Preliminary Results
The following results are collected from Mitrinovic et al., 1993.
Lemma 2 (Steffensen’s Inequality) Let g;h : [a;b]! R and F : [a;b]! [0;1] be
a distribution function. Suppose that g is monotonically increasing. Define
HF : (a;b]! R; HF (t) =
R t
a h(s)dF (s)=
R t
a dF (s) : If HF (t) HF (b) for all
t 2 (a;b]; then
Z b
a
g(s)h(s)dF (s)
Z b
a
g(s)dF (s)
Z b
a
h(s)dF (s) :
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Define
T ( f ;g; p) =
1R b
a p(x)dx
Z b
a
p(x) f (x)g(x)dx
  1R b
a p(x)dx
Z b
a
p(x) f (x)dx
Z b
a
p(x)g(x)dx
!
:
In particular, if p(x) = 1b a , T ( f ;g) = T ( f ;g; p).
Lemma 3 (Korkine’s identity)
T ( f ;g; p) =
1
2
Z b
a
Z b
a
p(t) p(s)( f (t)  f (s))(g(t) g(s))dtds:
Lemma 4
T ( f ;g) = f 0 (e)g0 (h)T (x;x) e;h 2 [a;b] :
Lemma 5 Assume j  f (x) f and g  g(x) G, then
T ( f ;g) 1
4
(f  j)(G  g) :
Lemma 6 If f () ;g() are totally(completely) monotonic,
T ( f ;g) 1
12
( f (b)  f (a))(g(b) g(a)) :
If f () ;g() are absolutely monotonic,
T ( f ;g) 4
45
( f (b)  f (a))(g(b) g(a)) :
Define K ( f ; p;q) =
R b
a q(x) f (x;x)dx 
R b
a
R b
a f (x;y) p(x;y)dxdy.
Lemma 7 K ( f ; p;q) = f21 (e;h)K ((x a)(y a) ; p;q)
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Lemma 8
1
b a
Z b
a
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

da 

1
b a
2 Z b
a
Z b
a
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

dadb
 1
4
 
u
 
F 1 (b) ;G 1 (b)

+u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

 u F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b) u F 1 (b) ;G 1 (a)
=
1
4
Z b
a
Z b
a
u21F 10G 10dadb
The following result is from Elezovic, Marangunic and Pecaric 2007.
Lemma 9 If f () and g() are absolutely continuous, for a;b > 1; 1a + 1b  1 we
have
jT ( f ;g)j  1
12

3
2
 1
a+
1
b
(b a)2  1a  1b  f 0a g0b :
The following result is from Barnett, Cerone, and Dragomir etc. 2001.
Lemma 10 Given p.d.f function f (x) defined over [a;b], if standard deviation s
exists, then
s 
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
p
3(b a)2
6 k fk¥ ; provided f 2 L¥ [a;b] , ;p
2(b a)1+ 1q
2[(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q
k fkp ; provided f 2 Lp [a;b] ,
and p> 1; 1p +
1
q = 1;
1
2 (b a) ; provided p= 1:
:
An Extension of McAfee (2002): Proof of Theorem 3.3.2 and 3.3.3
The proof of Theorem 3.3.2 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 11 If conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.3.1 hold,
1. (z  c)F 10 (z) and (z  c)G 10 (z) are increasing for z in (c;1]; and
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2. (c  z)F 10 (z) and (c  z)G 10 (z) are decreasing for z in [0;c).
Proof. Function (z  c)F 10 (z) is increasing if and only if (F (x)  c)= f (x) is
increasing. From condition (1) of Theorem 3.3.1, F (x)= f (x) is increasing. The
derivative is
d
dx
F (x)
f (x)
=
f 2 (x) F (x) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
> 0:
The derivative of (F (x)  c)= f (x) is
d
dx
F (x)  c
f (x)
=
f 2 (x)  (F (x)  c) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
:
If f 0 (x)< 0; [(F (x)  c)= f (x)]0 > 0 due to (F (x)  c)> 0. If f 0 (x)> 0, we have
f 2 (x)  (F (x)  c) f 0 (x)> f 2 (x) F (x) f 0 (x). That is [(F (x)  c)= f (x)]0 > 0.
Similarly, we can prove (z  c)G 10 (z) is increasing.
For the second statement:
Function (c  z)F 10 (z) is decreasing if and only if (c F (x))= f (x) is
decreasing. From condition (2) of Theorem 3.3.1, (1 F (x))= f (x) is decreasing.
The derivative is
d
dx
1 F (x)
f (x)
=
  f 2 (x)  (1 F (x)) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
< 0:
The derivative of (c F (x))= f (x) is
d
dx
c F (x)
f (x)
=
  f 2 (x)  (c F (x)) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
:
Note that c F (x)> 0 for z 2 [0;c): If f 0 (x)> 0, [(c F (x))= f (x)]0 < 0. If
f 0 (x)< 0,  (c F (x)) f 0 (x)< (1 F (x)) f 0 (x). Therefore,
d
dx
c F (x)
f (x)
=
  f 2 (x)  (c F (x)) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
<
  f 2 (x)  (1 F (x)) f 0 (x)
f 2 (x)
< 0:
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.2. Instead of proving the theorem directly, we show that
u2n u2n 1
u¥ u2n 1
 1
2
holds for any given n by induction. Theorem 3.3.1 shows that the above inequality
holds when n= 1. By induction, assume it is true for n 1. We need to show that
u2n u2n 1
u¥ u2n 1
 1
2
:
First rewrite u2n 1 as
u2n 1 =
2n 1
å
i=1
(F (xi) F (xi 1))
Z xi
xi 1
x
f (x)
F (xi) F (xi 1)dx

Z f(xi)
f(xi 1)
y
g(y)
G(f (xi)) G(f (xi 1))dy

with fixed cutoff points fxig2
n 1
i=0 .
To obtain 2n classes with cutoff point fxig2
n 1
i=0 [fzig2
n 1
i=0 , we insert 2
n 1 cutoff
points such that zi 2 [xi 1;xi] for i= 1; :::;2n 1. The payoff for this 2n-class CM is
u2n =
2n 1
å
i=1
(F (zi) F (xi 1))
Z zi
xi 1
x
f (x)
F (xi) F (xi 1)dx

Z f(zi)
f(xi 1)
y
g(y)
G(f (xi)) G(f (xi 1))dy

+
2n 1
å
i=2
(F (xi) F (zi 1))
Z xi
zi 1
x
f (x)
F (xi) F (zi 1)dx

Z f(xi)
f(zi 1)
y
g(y)
G(f (xi)) G(f (zi 1))dy

:
Let ci = F (xi) = G(f (xi)) and di = F (zi) = G(f (zi)). Rewrite above equations
to obtain:
u2n 1 =
2n 1
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz
u2n =
2n 1
å
i=1
(di  ci 1)
Z di
ci 1
F 1 (z)
di  ci 1dz
Z di
ci 1
G 1 (z)
di  ci 1dz
+
2n 1
å
i=1
(ci di)
Z ci
di
F 1 (z)
ci di dz
Z ci+1
di
G 1 (z)
ci di dz:
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Therefore,
u2n u2n 1
=
2n 1
å
i=1
1
di  ci 1
Z di
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z di
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

+
2n 1
å
i=1
1
ci di
Z ci
di

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z ci
di

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

:
Rewrite u¥ u2n 1 as
u¥ u2n 1
=
Z 1
0
F 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz 
2n 1
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz
=
2n 1
å
i=1
Z ci
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz:
Focus on one of those terms, we have
Z ci
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
=
Z di
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
+
Z ci
di

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz:
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Integrate by parts and collect terms to obtain
= (ci  ci 1)

F 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

 
Z di
ci 1
(z  ci 1)F 10 (z)

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
 
Z di
ci 1
(z  ci 1)G 10 (z)

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
+
Z ci
di
(ci  z)F 10 (z)

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
+
Z ci
di
(ci  z)G 10 (z)

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz:
Given the conditions required in Theorem 3.3.2 and Lemma 12,
 (ci  ci 1)

F 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

  1
di  ci 1
Z di
ci 1
(z  ci 1)F 10 (z)dz
Z di
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
  1
di  ci 1
Z di
ci 1
(z  ci 1)G 10 (z)dz
Z di
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
+
1
ci di
Z ci
di
(ci  z)F 10 (z)dz
Z ci
di

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz
+
1
ci di
Z ci
di
(ci  z)G 10 (z)dz
Z ci
di

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz:
Integrate by parts and collect terms:
= (ci  ci 1)

F 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

+
2
di  ci 1
Z di
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z di
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

+
2
ci di
Z ci
di

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z ci
di

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

:
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Thus
u¥ u2n 1
=
2n 1
å
i=1
Z ci
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

2n 1
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)

F 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

+
2n 1
å
i=1
2
di  ci 1
Z di
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z di
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

+
2n 1
å
i=1
2
ci di
Z ci
di

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

Z ci
di

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

dz

=
2n 1
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)

F 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

G 1 (di) 
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz

+2(u2n u2n 1) :
Let F 1 (di) =
Z ci
ci 1
F 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz or G
 1 (di) =
Z ci
ci 1
G 1 (z)
ci  ci 1dz. Hence
u2n u2n 1
u¥ u2n 1
 1
2
:
This immediately implies that
u2n u1
u¥ u1  1 
1
2n
:
Proof of Theorem 3.3.3. From the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 in McAfee (2002),
conditions (1) and (2) in Theorem 3.3.1 could ensure the validity of Chebyshev’s
inequality. Since Lemma 2 gives exactly the same inequality but under a weaker
condition, we only need to verify that the conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfied
given conditions (1) and (2) from Theorem 3.3.3. In the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 in
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McAfee (2002), Chebyshev’s inequality is applied to the following four terms:
Z c
0
zF 10 (z)
 
G 1 (z) my

dz;
Z c
0
zG 10 (z)
 
F 1 (z) mx

dzZ 1
c
(1  z)F 10 (z) G 1 (z) mydz and Z 1
c
(1  z)G 10 (z) F 1 (z) mxdz:
It is enough for us to consider
Z c
0
zF 10 (z)
 
G 1 (z) my

dz and
Z 1
c
(1  z)F 10 (z) G 1 (z) mydz:
Define HF (t) = 1t
R t
0 zF
 10 (z)dz. Since G 1 (z) my is increasing in z; for
Steffensen’s inequality to hold, we need to show that
1
t
Z t
0
zF 10 (z)dz 1
c
Z c
0
zF 10 (z)dz for all t 2 (0;c]
which is equivalent to
1
t
Z F 1(t)
0
F (x)dx 1
c
Z F 1(c)
0
F (x)dx:
Similarly, we need to show
1
1  t
Z 1 t
0
zF 10 (1  z)dz 1
1  c
Z 1 c
0
zF 10 (1  z)dz
Rewrite
R 1
t (1  z)F 10 (z)dz as
R 1 t
0 zF
 10 (1  z)dz: This is equivalent to
1
1  t
Z 1
t
(1  z)F 10 (z)dz 1
1  c
Z 1
c
(1  z)F 10 (z)dz for all t 2 (c;1]:
Therefore, conditions (1) and (2) in Theorem 3.3.3 are enough to guarantee that
Steffensen’s inequality to holds. Replace Chebyshev’s inequality by Steffensen’s
inequality in the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 in McAfee (2002), and Theorem 3.3.3
holds immediately.
Generalized CM: Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. To show that inequality (4) holds, we first show that
numerator u¥ un 
 
1=n2

Bi. Next, by letting bi = Bi=COV (x;f (x)) ; we have
(u¥ un)=(u¥ u1) bi=n2; which implies (un u1)=(u¥ u1) 1 bi=n2:
The following three circumstances derive Bi by using different versions of the
Gruss inequality.
Part 1:
u¥ un =
n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1) [
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz]
 1
4
n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)

 1
4
1
n2
:
The first inequality is due to Lemma 5. To show the second inequality, we choose
ci s.t.
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)

= 1n2 starting from i= 1 up
to some i until
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)
 1n2 . WLOG, we
could assume that for all i n 1, 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)

= 1n2 . Then the last term is 
1 ån 1i=1 ai
 
1 ån 1i=1 bi

; where ai =
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)

and
bi =
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)

. It is not difficult to show that 
1 ån 1i=1 ai
 
1 ån 1i=1 bi
  1n2 :
Part 2: By Lemma 9
u¥ un =
n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

 1
12

3
2
 1
p+
1
q n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)3 
1
p  1q F 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]p G 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]q
97
Let ci  ci 1 = 1n and 1p + 1q = 1;
 1
8n2
F 10 (z)[0;1]p G 10 (z)[0;1]q :
The above inequality is due to the Holder’s inequality. That is
n
å
i=1
F 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]p G 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]q
=
n
å
i=1
Z ci
ci 1
 
F 10 (x)
p
dx
 1
p
Z ci
ci 1
 
G 10 (x)
q
dx
 1
q

 
n
å
i=1
"Z ci
ci 1
 
F 10 (x)
p
dx
 1
p
#p! 1p  n
å
i=1
"Z ci
ci 1
 
G 10 (x)
q
dx
 1
q
#q! 1q
=
Z 1
0
 
F 10 (x)
p
dx
 1
p
Z 1
0
 
G 10 (x)
q
dx
 1
q
=
F 10 (z)[0;1]p G 10 (z)[0;1]q :
If p= q= ¥;
1
12

3
2
 1
p+
1
q n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)3 
1
p  1q F 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]p G 10 (z)[ci;ci 1]q
 1
12n3
n
å
i=1
F 10 (z)[0;1]¥ G 10 (z)[0;1]¥
=
1
12n2
F 10 (z)[0;1]¥ G 10 (z)[0;1]¥ :
Hence,
u¥ un  112n2
F 10 (z)[0;1]¥ G 10 (z)[0;1]¥
Part 3: By Holder’s inequality,
u¥ un 
n
å
i=1
(ci  ci 1)
 
1
ci  ci 1
Z ci
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
2
dz
! 1
2

 
1
ci  ci 1
Z ci
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz
2
dz
! 1
2
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According to Lemma 10, 
1
ci  ci 1
Z ci
ci 1

F 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
2
dz
! 1
2
 1
ci  ci 1
p
2
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
1+ 1q
2 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q
k fk[F
 1(ci 1);F 1(ci)]
p :
Also by Lemma 10 with p= 1; 
1
ci  ci 1
Z ci
ci 1

G 1 (z) 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz
2
dz
! 1
2
 1
2
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)

:
Let
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
1+ 1q  G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)=  1n2+ 1q :With an
analog argument as in Part 1, we could have
u¥ un

n
å
i=1
p
2
4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q n2+
1
q
 Z i
n
i 1
n
f p (q)dq
! 1
p

p
2
4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q n2+
1
q
0@ nå
i=1
0@ Z in
i 1
n
f p (q)dq
! 1
p
1Ap1A
1
p  
n
å
i=1
1
! 1
q
=
p
2
4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q n2+
1
q
k fk[0;1]p n
1
q
=
p
2
4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q n2
k fk[0;1]p :
The second inequality is due to Holder’s inequality.
Similarly, let
 
F 1 (ci) F 1 (ci 1)
 
G 1 (ci) G 1 (ci 1)
1+ 1q =  1n2+ 1q :
Then we also have
u¥ un 
p
2
4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q n2
kgk[0;1]p :
Since F 10 () is a continuous function, F 10[0;1]p G 10[0;1]q is continuous in p.
From (1=p)+(1=q) = 1, it is enough for us to focus on p. We also know that
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when p goes to infinity the value of
F 10[0;1]p increases and G 10[0;1]q goes toG 10[0;1]1 ; which is finite. Hence, the value of F 10[0;1]p G 10[0;1]q is either
finite or goes to infinity when p goes to infinity. Similarly, the value ofF 10[0;1]p G 10[0;1]q is either finite or goes to infinity when p approaches 1.
Therefore, the minimum value of
F 10[0;1]p G 10[0;1]q exists. For a similar
reason, the minimum of k fk[0;1]p =

4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q

and
kgk[0;1]p =

4 [(q+1)(2q+1)]
1
2q

over p also exist. Therefore, b can be obtained.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. 2): By Lemma 4, we have
COV (x;f (x)) = 112F
 10 (e)G 10 (h)
= 1=(12 f g) 1=(12AB). b3 in Theorem 3.4.1 is less than p
3A

=(12COV (x;f (x))) if p= ¥. Similarly b3 could also be p
3B

=(12COV (x;f (x))). Hence,
b3 
p
3
p
AB

=(12COV (x;f (x))) =
p
3AB
3
2 .
3): By Lemma 3, we haveCOV (x;f (x)) = 12
R 1
0
R 1
0 f (x)g(y)(x  y)2 dxdy 112ab .
Using b2 of Theorem 3.4.1 with p= q= ¥;
b2 =
F 10[0;1]¥ G 10[0;1]¥
12COV (x;f (x))
=
ab
12COV (x;f (x))
:
That is, b2  a2b2.
4): By Lemma 4 u¥ un =å 112n2F
 10 (ei)G 10 (hi) 112n2ab : By Lemma 4
COV (x;f (x)) =
1
12
F 10 (e)G 10 (h) 1
12AB
: It is obvious that the result holds.
CM with General Match Payoff: Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
The following theorem is a stronger version of Theorem 3.4.2.
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Theorem 3.4.20 For any c.d.f. F (q) ;G(q) defined over a non-negative bounded
type space [a;b] with u21F 10G 1
0  A, we have
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
b˜
n2
;
where b˜ =min
n
b˜1; b˜2; b˜3
o
1. b˜1 = AA if u21F
 10G 10  A;
2. b2 = 3A
R b
a u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

F 10 (a)G 10 (a)da
if ¶
4
¶a2¶b 2u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )
 0;
3. b3 = 3A (u(b;b)+u(a;a) u(a;b) u(b;a))
if ¶
4
¶a2¶b 2u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )
 0:
Proof. Part 1: By Lemma 7;
u¥ un =å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

da
 

1
ci  ci 1
2 Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

dadb
!
=å(ci  ci 1)u21 (ei;hi)F 10 (ei)G 10 (hi)

1
12
(ci  ci 1)2

By letting ci  ci 1 = 1n together with u21F 10G 10 2

A;A

,
u¥ un  112n2A:
Also
u¥ u1 = 112u21 (e;h)F
 10 (e)G 10 (h) 1
12
A:
Hence, by letting b˜1 = A=A; we have
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
b˜1
n2
:
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Part 2: By Lemma 8;
u¥ un =å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

da
 

1
ci  ci 1
2 Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

dadb
!
 1
4å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

F 10 (a)G 10 (b )dadb :
If ¶
4
¶a2¶b 2u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )
 0,Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;F 1 (b )

F 10 (a)G 10 (b )dadb
 (ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

F 10 (a)G 10 (a)da .
Hence,
1
4å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u21F 10G 10dadb
 1
4å(ci  ci 1)
2
Z ci
ci 1
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

F 10 (a)G 10 (a)da
=
1
4n2
Z 1
0
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

F 10 (a)G 10 (a)da :
The last equality holds by letting ci  ci 1 = 1n : Similarly as in part 1, we have
b2 =
3
A
Z 1
0
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

F 10 (a)G 10 (a)da:
Part 3: Using Lemma 8;
1
4å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u21
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (b )

F 10 (a)G 10 (b )dadb
 1
4n2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
u21F 10 (a)G 10 (b )dadb
=
1
4n2
(u(b;b)+u(a;a) u(a;b) u(b;a)) :
The inequality is proved below. From here, by letting
b3 =
3
A
(u(b;b)+u(a;a) u(a;b) u(b;a))
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the result holds. Cutoff points fcig are chosen such that ci = in :
We will illustrate the inequality by showing the case n= 3 with [a;b] = [0;1] : It is
the same procedure to prove for any n and any domain [a;b]. Denote
U (a ;b ) = u
 
F 1 (a) ;G 1 (a)

.
å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
Z ci
ci 1
u21F 10G 10dadb
=
1
3
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
1
3
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb
Since ¶
4
¶a2¶b 2u
 
F 1 (a) ;F 1 (b )
 0 implies thatU21 is substitute in a and b ;
we claim that the following inequality holds
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb

Z 1
3
0
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb
To see this, rewrite the following terms:
Z 1
3
0
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb =
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21

a ;b +
1
3

dadb
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb =
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21

a+
1
3
;b

dadb
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb =
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21

a+
1
3
;b +
1
3

dadb
Then ¶
4
¶a2¶b 2u
 
F 1 (a) ;F 1 (b )

< 0 implies
U21

a+
1
3
;b +
1
3

+U21 (a;b )
U21

a+
1
3
;b

+U21

a ;b +
1
3

:
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From this,
Z 2
3
0
Z 2
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb
=
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb
+
Z 1
3
0
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb
 2
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb +2
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb
Similarly,
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a;b )dadb

Z 1
2
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadbZ 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a;b )dadb

Z 1
2
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb :
Hence,
3
 Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb
!

Z 1
3
0
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb
+
Z 1
2
3
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a;b )dadb +
Z 1
2
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb
+
Z 1
3
0
Z 1
2
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 1
3
0
Z 2
3
1
3
U21 (a ;b )dadb +
Z 2
3
1
3
Z 1
3
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
U21 (a ;b )dadb :
Omitted Algebra from Example 3.2 and 4.4
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Example 3.1 and 3.2. Consider F (x) = G(x) = 1  (1  x) 14 with p.d.f.
f (x) = g(x) = 14 (1  x) 
3
4 :
The cutoff point c= m = 45 :
d
dx

1 F(x)
f (x)

= 4< 0. Hence, the second condition is satisfied.
F(x)
f (x) =
1 (1 x) 14
1
4 (1 x) 
3
4
. ddx

F(x)
f (x)

= 1
(1 x) 14

4(1  x) 14  3

; which is not always
positive.
In particular, ddx

F(x)
f (x)

jx=m = 0:48605< 0
E
h
F(x)
f (x) j x< 45
i
= 125
p
5+ 125
4
p
5+ 1255
3
4 + 125and
E
h
F(x)
f (x) j x< t
i
=  14p1 t 1
 
t  45t 4
p
1  t+ 45 4
p
1  t  45

increasing in t when
t  m:
Hence, the result still holds. In fact, u2 u0u¥ u0  
1
2 = 0:22676:
Example 3.4.4. Consider the same distributions F (x) = G(x) = x
1
a over [0;1]
with densities f (x) = g(x) = 1a x
1
a 1 and a 2 (0;¥). The inverse function of c.d.f.
is F 1 (x) = xa :
(i) Note that (F (x)= f (x))0 = a > 0 and
[(1 F (x))= f (x)]0 = x  1a

x
1
a a a+1

; which implies that F (x) is condition
2 of Theorem 3.3.2 over [0;1] only when a  1. Therefore, for a  1 we have
u2n u1
u¥ u1  1 
1
2n
:
(ii) Now we will use Theorem 3.4.1 and corollaries derived above to generalize
this result. Since both sides have the same distribution function,
COV (x;x)=s2x =
Z 1
0
x2adx 
Z 1
0
xadx
2
=
1
2a+1
 

1
a+1
2
=
a2
(a+1)2 (2a+1)
:
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For a  1, the density is f (x) = 1a x
1
a 1. If we use Theorem 3.4.1 directly, the
problem is that f (x) goes to infinity when x approaches zero. Hence, b2 involving
k fk[0;1]p is not tight enough to give a meaningful lower bound. For b3; which
involves
F 10 (z)[0;1]p , F 10 (z) = axa 1 becomes so large as a increases.
Therefore, when a is large enough, b3 is not tight enough. Also when a is large,
the distribution is highly asymmetric, which makes b1 is not tight. If a is close to
zero, we have the same problem. Hence, Theorem 3.4.1 can not provide a
meaningful lower bound when a is either too large or too small. To provide a
meaningful lower bound, we’ll use a combination of both k fkp and
F 10 (z)p.
To do this, we split the type space into two intervals by a properly chosen point c.
Then we use
F 10 (z)[0;c]p and k fk[F 1(c);1]p respectively on each interval.
Given n, Let q  and corresponding c = F (q ) be the splitting point. We consider
n to be an even number and an odd number separately. If n= 2m with m 2 N;
u¥ un
=
m
å
i=0
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

+
n
å
i=m+1
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

 c
2
12(m)2
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +
p
3(1 q )3
12(m)2
k fk[q;1]¥ :
Let q  =
 1
2
 1p
a and c = F (q ) =
 1
2
pa
. Note that the total number of classes is
2m. In the spirit of the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 we have
b 1 =
c2
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +p3(1 q )3 k fk[q;1]¥
3s2x
:
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Denote B= b 1s
2
x . In order to compare b 1 and 2, we compare
COV (x;x) 2B
=
a2
(a+1)2 (2a+1)
  1
6
 
1
2
pa!2
a2
 
1
2
pa!2a 2
 
p
3
6
 
1 

1
2
 1p
a
!3
1
a

1
2
 1p
a (
1
a 1)
 0:
The last inequality holds for a  1: Therefore, b 1  2 if n= 2m and a  1.
If n= 2m+1 with m 2 N,
u¥ un =å(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

=
m 1
å
i=0
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

+
n
å
i=m
(ci  ci 1)
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)G 1 (z)dz
 
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1F
 1 (z)dz
Z ci
ci 1
1
ci  ci 1G
 1 (z)dz

 c
2
12(m)2
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +
p
3(1 q )3
12(m+1)2
k fk[q;1]¥ :
Let q  =
 1
2
 1p
a and c = F (q ) =
 1
2
pa
. Similarly,
n2
c2
12(m)2
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +n2
p
3(1 q )3
12(m+1)2
k fk[q;1]¥
= (2m+1)2
c2
12(m)2
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +(2m+1)2
p
3(1 q )3
12(m+1)2
k fk[q;1]¥
 3c
2
4
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +
p
3(1 q )3
4
k fk[q;1]¥ :
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Let
b 2 =
3c2
4s2x
F 10 (z)[0;c]¥ G 10 (z)[0;c]¥ +
p
3(1 q )3
4s2x
k fk[q;1]¥ :
Since n= 2m+1, we start by comparing b2 to 3.
Denote B0 = b 2s
2
x . Then
s2x  
1
3
B0 =
a2
(a+1)2 (2a+1)
  1
4
 
1
2
pa!2
a2
 
1
2
pa!2a 2
 
p
3
12
 
1 

1
2
 1p
a
!3
1
a

1
2
 1p
a (
1
a 1)
 0:
The inequality holds for a  1: Hence, b 2  3 for n= 2m+1 and a  1.
By far, we have shown that for even number classes b 1  2; for odd number
classes we have b 1  3.
Similarly, we can have the same result for a < 1, by choosing k fk[0;q]¥ andF 10 (z)[c;1]¥ instead. For n= 2m we have b 1  2 due to
a2
(a+1)2 (2a+1)
 1
6
 
1 

1
2
pa!2
a2
 
1
2
pa!2a 2
+
p
3
6

1
2
 3p
a 1
a

1
2
 1p
a (
1
a 1)
:
For n= 2m+1; we have b 2  3 due to
a2
(a+1)2 (2a+1)
 1
4
 
1 

1
2
pa!2
a2
 
1
2
pa!2a 2
+
p
3
12

1
2
 3p
a 1
a

1
2
 1p
a (
1
a 1)
:
In sum,
u2 u1
u¥ u1 
1
2
or
un u1
u¥ u1  1 
3
n2
for any a 2 (0;¥) and n 3.
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Monopolistic Pricing: Omitted Steps and Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
OPTIMAL CONTRACT. Incentive compatibility condition together with
integration by parts implies
t (q) = t (0)+qu(a(q)) 
Z q
0
u(a(q))dFˆ (q) :
Substituting back into the objective function we get:
Z 1
0

q   1  Fˆ (q)
fˆ (q)

u(a(q))  ca(q)

dFˆ (q) :
It is standard in the literature to assume that
 
1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q) is increasing in
q :Let q satisfy q   1 Fˆ(q)
fˆ (q) = 0. The optimal contract then has a(q) = t (q) = 0
for q < q . The optimal contract also needs to satisfy
q   1  Fˆ (q)
fˆ (q)

u0 (a(q)) = c:
This condition together with
 
1  Fˆ (q)= fˆ (q) is an increasing function, implying
that the optimal contract is monotonic in agent’s type.
Denote the optimal contract as a (q). The maximized profit obtained by the
monopolist is
p¥ =
Z 1
q

q   1  Fˆ (q)
fˆ (q)

u(a (q))  ca (q)

dFˆ (q) :
EXISTENCE OF n-LEVEL CONTRACT. It would be enough to show the
existence of a 3-level contract. The same procedure extends it for arbitrary n:
For any 3-level contract f(a1; t1) ;(a2; t2) ;(a3; t3)g that satisfies IC and IR
conditions, given IR conditions, we need qu(a1)  t1  0; which is binding to
maximize the profit. Hence, t1 = qu(a1) : From IC conditions:
qu(a1)  t1  qu(a2)  t2 and qu(a1)  t1  qu(a3)  t3 if q  q1:
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By the first inequality, q1 =
t2  t1
u(a2) u(a1) . Similarly, q2 =
t3  t2
u(a3) u(a2) :
We need to verify that qu(a1)  t1  qu(a3)  t3 if q  q1. Since qu(a1)  t1
 qu(a2)  t2 if q  q1; qu(a1)  t1  qu(a3)  t3 if
qu(a2)  t2  qu(a3)  t3; which is q  t3  t2u(a3) u(a2) = q2. To verify
qu(a3)  t3  qu(a1)  t1 if q  q3; similarly, we only need to verify
qu(a2)  t2  qu(a1)  t1. If qu(a2)  t2  qu(a1)  t1, all IC conditions hold.
This is equivalent to q  t2  t1
u(a2) u(a1) = q1.
Now we construct a 3-level stochastic contract which has the same profit as p3; the
valued yielded by 3-class CM. Let a1 (x) = a (x) if x 2 [q ;q1], a2 (x) = a (x) if
x 2 [q1;q2] and a3 (x) = a (x) if x 2 [q2;1]. The expected utility for an agent with
type q 2 [q ;q1] is
qEu(a1) =
q
Fˆ (q1)  Fˆ (q)
 Z q1
q
u(a (q))dFˆ (q) :
The expected utility for an agent with type q 2 [q1;q2] is
qEu(a2) =
q
Fˆ (q2)  Fˆ (q1)
 Z q2
q1
u(a (q))dFˆ (q) :
The expected utility for an agent with type q 2 [q2;1] is
qEu(a3) =
q
1  Fˆ (q2)
 Z 1
q2
u(a (q))dFˆ (q) :
The transfers correspondingly are
t1 = qEu(a1) , t2 = q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))+qEu(a1)
t3 = q2 (Eu(a3) Eu(a2))+q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))+qEu(a1) :
By the above argument, such a contract satisfies IC and IR conditions.
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By offering such a contract, the profit is
p˜3 = qEu(a1)

Fˆ (q1)  Fˆ (q)

+(q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))+qEu(a1))

Fˆ (q2)  Fˆ (q1)

+(q2 (Eu(a3) Eu(a2))+q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))+qEu(a1))

1  Fˆ (q2)

  c
Z 1
q
a (q)dFˆ (q)
= qEu(a1)

1  Fˆ (q)+q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))1  Fˆ (q1)
+q2 (Eu(a3) Eu(a2))

1  Fˆ (q2)
  cZ 1
q
a (q)dFˆ (q) ;
while the 3-class CM yields
p3 =
1
Fˆ (q1)  Fˆ (q)
 Z q1
q
f (q)dFˆ (q)
Z q1
q
u(a (q))dFˆ (q)
+
1
Fˆ (q2)  Fˆ (q1)
 Z q2
q1
f (q)dFˆ (q)
Z q2
q1
u(a (q))dFˆ (q)
+
1
1  Fˆ (q2)
 Z 1
q2
f (q)dFˆ (q)
Z 1
q2
u(a (q))dFˆ (q)  c
Z 1
q
a (q)dFˆ (q)
= qEu(a1)

Fˆ (q1)  Fˆ (q)

+(q  q1)Eu(a1)

1  Fˆ (q1)

+q1Eu(a2)

Fˆ (q2)  Fˆ (q1)

+(q1 q2)Eu(a2)

1  Fˆ (q2)

+q2Eu(a3)

1  Fˆ (q2)
  cZ 1
q
a (q)dFˆ (q)
= qEu(a1)

1  Fˆ (q)+q1 (Eu(a2) Eu(a1))1  Fˆ (q1)
+q2 (Eu(a3) Eu(a2))

1  Fˆ (q2)
  cZ 1
q
a (q)dFˆ (q) :
Hence, p˜3 = p3:
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. Applying the analog argument in the proof of
Theorem 3.4.1 and taking the fact that G is defined over [f (0) ;f (1)] into account,
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we show that p¥ pn C
 
Bˆi=n2

. Then by letting bˆi = Bˆi=p¥, we get the result.
Example 3.5.1. Consider u(a) = a
1
2 and Fˆ (q) = qa . From j (q)u0 (a) = c we
can derive that a= j2=4c2. From the assumption that the distribution satisfies
IFR, a  1, R¥ =
R 1
q

q   1 Fˆ(q)
fˆ (q)

u(a(q))dF (q) = 12c
R 1
q j2dFˆ (q). Without
loss of generality, let c= 12 .
R¥ =
Z 1
q
j (q)2 dFˆ (q) =
Z 1
( 1a+1)
1
a

q   1 q
a
aqa 1
2
aqa 1dq
=
a
a2 4
 
1
a+1
 2
a
+a

1
a+1
 2
a
 1
!
;
p¥ = R¥  12
Z 1
q
j (q)2 dF (q) =
1
2
R¥
and
¶j
¶q
=
¶
¶q

q   1 q
a
aqa 1

=
1
qaa
(a+qaa+qa  1) :
¶q
¶j
=
1
1
qaa (a+qaa+qa  1)
:
By a change of variable,
R 1
q j (q)dF (q) =
R 1
0 jdFˆ (q (j)) : Here q (j) is the
inverse function of j (q) : Denote F (j) = Fˆ (q (j)) :We have
f (j) = fˆ (q (j))q 0 (j) = aqa 1 ¶q¶j .
That is f (j) = aqa 1
1
1
qaa (a+qaa+qa  1)
= q 2a 1
a2
a+qaa+qa  1 ; where q 2
"
1
a+1
 1
a
;1
#
:
Taking the derivative of f (f), we have
d
dq

q 2a 1
a2
a+qaa+qa  1

= q 2a 2a2
a 1
(a+qa +qaa 1)2 (2a+q
a +qaa 1)> 0;
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because qa (1+a) 1. Hence, q 2a 1 a2a+qaa+qa 1 is increasing in q , and,
k fk[q ;1]¥ = a=2: Use b3 from Proposition 3.5.1, b3 =
p
3k fk[q ;1]¥
12p¥
: If a 2 [1;20];
p¥ 
p
3
24
k fk[q ;1]¥ =
a
a2 4
 
1
a+1
 2
a
+a

1
a+1
 2
a
 1
!
 
p
3
48
a
 0 :
Hence, we have b3  2: Therefore, for any a 2 [1;20]; p

n
p¥
 1  2
n2
:
Example 3.5.2. Now we solve for the optimal 2-level contract:
maxq1a
1
2
1 (q2 q1)+

q2

a
1
2
2  a
1
2
1

+q1a
1
2
1

[1 q2]  ca1 (q2 q1) 
ca2 [1 q2] :
FOC:
q1 : a
1
2
1 (1 2q1)+ ca1 = 0
q2 :

a
1
2
2  a
1
2
1

[1 2q2]  ca1+ ca2 = 0
a1 : 12q1a
  12
1 (q2 q1)+ 12a
  12
1 [q1 q2] [1 q2]  c(q2 q1) = 0
a2 : 12q2a
  12
2 [1 q2]  c [1 q2] = 0:
Solving those equations we get:
q1 = 35 ; q2 =
4
5 ; ca
1
2
1 =
1
5 ; ca
1
2
2 =
2
5 :
The profit is p2 =
1
25c :Hence, b˜ = u(a
 (1))=(4p2 ). We’ve already shown that
a (q) = f (q)=2c. Therefore, b˜ = 25=8: Therefore, we have
pn
p¥
 1  b˜
n2
:
Cost-Sharing: Omitted Steps and Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
PROBLEM FORMULATION. The principal offers a contract to minimize
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expected transfer T (x) to the firm, which is:
min
T (x);y(x)
Z 1
0
T (x)dF (x)
s.t. T (x)  (x  y(xjx))  1
4k
y2 (xjx)
 T (x˜)  (x  y(x˜jx))  1
4k
y2 (x˜jx) and
T (x)  (x  y(x))  1
4k
y2 (xjx) 0 for all x 2 [0;1] ;
where x  y(x˜jx) = x˜  y(x˜).
THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT. Define u(x) = T (x)  (x  y(xjx))  14ky2 (xjx).
From the envelope theorem for the agent,
u0 (x) = dC (y(x˜jx))
dx
jx˜=x = C0 (y(x)) 0:
Hence, u(1) = 0:
u(x) =
Z 1
x
C0 (y(x˜))dx˜:
This implies thatZ 1
0
u(x)dF (x) =
Z 1
0
C0 (y(x))
F (x)
f (x)
dF (x) andZ 1
0
T (x)dF (x) =
Z 1
0

x  y(x)+C (y(x))+C0 (y) F (x)
f (x)

dF (x) :
The derivative w.r.t. y(x) is
 1+C0 (y(x))+C00 (y(x)) F (x)
f (x)
:
Since C (y) = 14ky
2, the derivative becomes
 1+ 1
2k
y(x)+
1
2k
F (x)
f (x)
:
If F (x)= f (x) 2k, to minimize cost y(x) = 0. If F (x)= f (x) 2k, then
y(x) = 2k F (x)= f (x). Since F (x)= f (x) is an increasing function, y(x) is
decreasing in x and bounded below by zero.
114
Denote x =minffx;1gj [F (x)= f (x)] = 2k:g. The expected transfer to the firm is
Z 1
0

x  y (x)+ 1
4k
y (x)2+
1
2k
y (x)
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
= mx 
Z 1
0
y (x)

1  1
4k
y (x)  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
= mx 
Z x
0

2k  F (x)
f (x)

1
2
  1
4k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
= mx  k
Z x
0

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)
2
dF (x) :
EXISTENCE OF n-level LCSCR CONTRACT WITH COST REDUCTION
EQUALS un 1:
For illustration purpose, we show the existence of a 3-level LCSCR contract that
has cost reduction equals to u2: The same procedure shows it for arbitrary n.
The principal offers a firm a contract containing fT1;a1g ; fT2;a2g if the firm has a
type belonging to [0;x1] and [x

1;x
] respectively and a cost reimbursement contract
if the firm has a type greater than x. The firm with x< x needs to solve
max
y
(1 ai)y  14ky
2:
Then yi = 2k (1 ai) :
The firm’s profit under such contract is
Ti+ai (x  y(x)) C (y(x))  (x  y(x))
= Ti  [1 ai] [x 2k (1 ai)]  14k [2k (1 ai)]
2 :
The firm with x> x exerts no effort and the profit is zero.
When x= x, the profit of the firm is zero. Hence,
T2  [1 a2] [x 2k (1 a2)]  14k [2k (1 a2)]
2 = 0:
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This implies
T2 = (1 a2)x  k (1 a2)2 :
A firm with type x1 should be indifferent to choosing between the two contracts.
Therefore,
That is
T1 = (1 a2)x+(a2 a1)x1  k (1 a1)2 :
The principal’s expected cost is
Z x1
0
T1+a1 [x  y(x)]dF (x)+
Z x
x1
T2+a2 [x  y(x)]dF (x)
=
Z x1
0

(1 a2)x+(a2 a1)x1+a1x  k
 
1 a21

dF (x)
+
Z x
x1

a2x+(1 a2)x  k
 
1 a22

dF (x) :
The principal minimizes expected cost over a1 and a2; which yields first order
conditions
Z x1
0
[x  x1]dF (x) = 2ka1
Z x1
0
dF (x) andZ x
x1
[x  x]dF (x) = 2ka2
Z x
x1
dF (x)+
Z x1
0
[x  x1]dF (x) :
The cost reduction associate with such contract is
Z x1
0
 (1 a2)x  (a2 a1)x1+(1 a1)x+ k 1 a21dF (x)
+
Z x
x1

(1 a2)(x  x)+ k
 
1 a22

dF (x)
=
Z x1
0

(1 a1)(x  x1)+(1 a2)(x1  x)+ k
 
1 a21

dF (x)
+
Z x
x1

(1 a2)(x  x)+ k
 
1 a22

dF (x)
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= 2ka1 (1 a1)
Z x1
0
dF (x)+
Z x1
0
 
(1 a2)(x1  x)+ k
 
1 a21

dF (x)
 2ka2 (1 a2)
Z x
x1
dF (x)+
Z x
x1

k
 
1 a22

dF (x)+(1 a2)
Z x1
0
[x  x1]dF (x)
= 2ka1 (1 a1)
Z x1
0
dF (x)+
Z x1
0
k
 
1 a21

dF (x)
 2ka2 (1 a2)
Z x
x1
dF (x)+
Z x
x1

k
 
1 a22

dF (x)
=
Z x1
0
k (1 a1)2 dF (x)+
Z x
x1
k (1 a2)2 dF (x) :
Since
u2 =
k
F
 
x1
 Z x1
0

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
2
+
k
F (x) F  x1
Z x
x1

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
2
;
by letting
1 a1 = 1F  x1
Z x1
0

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x)
1 a2 = 1F (x) F  x1
Z x
x1

1  1
2k
F (x)
f (x)

dF (x) ;
such a 3-level LCSCR contract has cost reduction equals u2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2. By the proof of Theorem 3.4.1, we have
u¥ un 1  kF (x
)
4(n 1)2 
k
4(n 1)2 :
Then
u¥ un 1
u¥
 1
4(n 1)2
k
u¥
:
This implies
un 1
u¥
 1  b
(n 1)2 ;
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where b =
k
4u¥
:
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